Full Description
Levels of Analysis in Psychopathology draws research from psychiatry, philosophy, and psychology to explore the variety of explanatory approaches for understanding the nature of psychiatric disorders both in practice and research. The fields of psychiatry and clinical psychology incorporates many useful explanatory approaches and this book integrates this range of perspectives and makes suggestions about how to advance etiologic theories, classification, and treatment. The editors have brought together leading thinkers who have been widely published and are well-respected in their area of expertise, including several developers of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders and authors of the US National Institute of Mental Health's Research Domain Criteria Project (RDoC). Each main chapter has a commentary provided by one of the other authors and an introduction written by one of the editors to create an accessible, interdisciplinary dialog.
Contents
Introduction; Part I. Neuroscience, Mechanisms and RDoC: 1. Introduction Peter Zachar; 2. Rethinking psychiatric disorders in terms of heterarchical networks of control mechanisms William Bechtel; 3. A typology of levels of mechanisms involved in the etiology of psychiatric illness Kenneth S. Kendler; 4. Introduction Kenneth S. Kendler; 5. Wrangling the matrix: lessons from the RDoC working memory domain Robert M. Bilder; 6. Brain and mind in psychiatry? Presuppositions of cognitive ontology Georg Northoff; 7. Introduction Kenneth S. Kendler; 8. Tackling hard problems: neuroscience, treatment, and anxiety Daniel S. Pine; 9. Comments on Daniel S. Pine Kenneth F. Schaffner; Part II. Phenomenology, Biological Psychology, and the Mind-Body Problem: 10. Introduction Josef Parnas; 11. Body self-awareness: multiple levels or dynamical gestalt? Shaun Gallagher; 12. Commentary on Gallagher 'Body self-awareness: multiple levels or dynamical gestalt?' Jan-Willem Romeijn; 13. Introduction Josef Parnas; 14. Can psychiatry dispense with appeal to mental causation? John Campbell; 15. Folk psychology and Jaspers' empathic understanding: a conceptual exercise? Peter Zachar; 16. Introduction Peter Zachar; 17. Phenomenology of a disordered self in schizophrenia: example of an integrative level for psychiatric research Josef Parnas and Maja Zanderson; 18. Who is the psychiatric subject? Shaun Gallagher; 19. Introduction Kenneth S. Kendler; 20. Challenges in the relationships between psychological and biological phenomena in psychopathology Gregory A. Miller and Morgan E. Bartholomew; 21. Non-reductionism, eliminativism, and modularity in RDoC: thoughts about a progressive mechanistic science Peter Zachar; Part III. Taxonomy, Integration and Multiple Levels of Explanation: 22. Introduction Josef Parnas; 23. Descriptive psychopathology: a manifest level of analysis, or not? Peter Zachar; 24. Psychiatry without description Josef Parnas; 25. Introduction Peter Zachar; 26. Should psychiatry be precise? Reduction, big data, and nosological revision in mental health research Kathryn Tabb; 27. Commentary on should psychiatry be precise? Reduction, big data, and nosological revision in mental health research Robert M. Bilder; 28. Introduction Peter Zachar; 29. Psychiatric classification: an a-reductionist perspective Jan-Willem Romeijn and Hanna van Loo; 30. Double black diamond Eric Turkheimer; 31. Introduction Peter Zachar; 32. Approaches to multi-level models of fear: the what, where, why, how, and how much? Kenneth F. Schaffner; 33. Schaffner on levels and selves William Bechtel; 34. Introduction Kenneth S. Kendler; 35. Levels: what are they and what are they good for? James Woodward; 36. Levels of analysis in Alzheimer's disease research Stephan Heckers; 37. Introduction Peter Zachar; 38. The impact of faculty psychology and theories of psychological causation on the origins of modern psychiatric nosology Kenneth S. Kendler; 39. Commentary on 'The impact of faculty psychology and theories of psychological causation on the origins of modern psychiatric nosology' Gregory A. Miller; 40. Introduction Kenneth S. Kendler; 41. Psychiatric discourse: scientific reductionism for the autonomous person Stephan Heckers; 42. Comment on Stephan Heckers, 'Psychiatric discourse: scientific reductionism for the autonomous person' John Campbell; 43. Introduction Josef Parnas; 44. Entity focus: applied genetic science at different levels Eric Turkheimer; 45. Comment on 'Entity focus: applied genetic science at different levels' by Eric Turkheimer Kathryn Tabb.
