Informal power in Hungary and Poland

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Informal power in Hungary and Poland

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  • 製本 Hardcover:ハードカバー版/ページ数 200 p.
  • 言語 ENG
  • 商品コード 9781032911472

Full Description

This book is about the nature of informal governmental power in Hungary and Poland. It highlights the key differences and similarities between the Orbán regime and the Kaczyński regime to show how they make societies dependent on the ruling elite. The monograph explains how coercive practices of these governments could avoid scrutiny of the European Union. The book unpacks the underlying reasons for ineffectiveness of the EU in the context of the changing geopolitical environment and war in Ukraine.

Contents

Chapter 1. Introduction

1.1. Purpose of the book

1.2. Contribution

1.3. Case selection and method

Chapter 2. Informal power, democratic backsliding, and the constraining role of the EU

2.1. Informal power in CEE - theoretical expectations

2.2. The sanctioning role of the EU

Chapter 3. Authoritarian remodelling in Hungary and Poland

3.1. Preconditions for authoritarian remodeling

3.2. Traits of populism

3.3. How democracy died in Hungary and got distorted in Poland

3.3.1. Hollowed out the democratic institution by capturing the "referees"

3.3.2. Sidelined key players to undermine the opposition

3.3.3. Rewrote the electoral rules and democratic process to create an uneven political playing field

3.4. Democratic backsliding during the COVID-19 pandemic

Chapter 4. Informal power in action

4.1. Clientelist corruption in Hungary and Poland

The coercive monopolization of the state and economy

Monopolies, concessions

Private property is not protected, coercion is key

NGOs, state funds as key instruments

Opening towards Russia and China - a strategy to extend clientelist corruption

Informality around the PiS headquarter

Re-centralization, and the role of Polish state-owned companies

Nepotism and misused state funds

Low-intensity coercion and the role of the special funds

4.2. Media Capture

Unprecedented centralization of media ownership

Weaponized state funds in the Orban regime

"Repolonization" of the media

Weaponization of state funds in the Kaczynski regime

4.3. Electoral clientelism and beyond

Economic and policy coercion

PiS's clientelistic tactics to win elections

Chapter 5. Two faces of informal power: systemic differences

Poland on a different democratic trajectory

Chapter 6. The constraining role of the EU: a decade of appeasement.

6.1. The toolbox

Rule of law framework

"Preventative" Annual Rule of Law Reports and other monitoring tools

The European Semester

Article 7(1) procedure

Infringement procedures

Freezing EU funds - The Rule of Law conditionality Mechanism and the Enabling conditions

The Media Freedom Act

6.2. Why did the EU react differently to democratic and rule of law backsliding in Poland and Hungary?

6.3. Is withholding money an effective strategy?

6.4. Towards the politicization of EU strategies

7. Conclusion and recommendations for the European Union

7.1. Three lessons and a warning

7.2. Limitations of the book

7.3. Pathways towards a more efficient Europe

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