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Full Description
This volume presents state-of-the-art research on issues related to evidentialism. It demonstrates the continuing relevance of evidentialist epistemology by bringing it into direct confrontation with some of its latest non-evidentialist rivals and by proposing new areas for exploration and development.
Conee and Feldman's landmark paper "Evidentialism" (1985) served as a launching point for an enormous research program in epistemology. Many epistemologists define their points of view at least partly in terms of how they relate to evidentialism. The chapters in this volume address important questions related to evidentialism, including:
How should 'evidentialism' be defined?
When does evidence suffice for belief?
What does properly or appropriately responding to one's evidence involve?
Does evidentialism capture all cases of epistemically justified believing?
Is there any kind of epistemic normativity that falls outside the purview of evidentialist epistemology?
Are core evidentialist theses compatible with certain forms of externalism?
Do classical evidentialist theses successfully preclude pragmatism?
Do moral considerations ever get a say in what it is rational to believe?
What (more) should evidentialists say about suspending judgment?
What is the connection between evidence and logical inference?
What should evidentialists say about extended memory?
Does public evidence matter to epistemic justification?
The range of fresh ideas in this cutting-edge volume, marking the 40th anniversary of "Evidentialism", will appeal to scholars and graduate students working on evidentialism, evidence, the nature of justification, evidential support, and related topics in epistemology.
Contents
Introductory Note: New Arguments and New Angles on Evidentialism Part 1: Understanding Evidentialism 1. Varieties of Evidentialism 2. Permissivist Evidentialism 3. Support Per (and For) Evidentialism 4. Extreme Evidentialism 5. Rethinking Evidentialism 6. How to Combine Evidentialism with Knowledge-First Epistemology Part 2: Evidentialism and Normativity 7. Does Epistemology Rest on a Mistake? Rochester Internalism and the Normative Question 8. Evidentialism, Encroachment, and the Moral Importance of Understanding 9. The Applied Moral Turn of the Ethics of Belief Debate 10. Why Are (Some) Epistemic Norms Evidential? Part 3: Challenges for Evidentialism 11. Evidentialism and Foundationalism 12. Against Indicator Evidentialism 13. Evidentialism and Having Evidence 14. What is Sufficient Evidence? 15. Zetetic Norms: A Puzzle for Evidentialism? 16. Evidentialism and Normative Expectations 17. Evidence and Withholding: Four Recent Objections to Evidentialism Part 4: New Angles for Evidentialism 18. Group Evidence, Group Belief, and Group Responsibility Transmission 19. Purism and Pluralism: On the Brilliance of Tarot and the Breadth of Epistemology 20. Reasoned Change in Logic 21. Experience, Plausibility, and Evidence Part 5: Evidentialists Against Evidentialism 22. Evidentialism and Pragmatism Disputed; Evidential and Practical Reasons Defended
