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Full Description
This book presents novel approaches and perspectives to scholarship on epistemic injustice and particularly, testimonial injustice and their connections with public trust.
Drawing from different philosophical schools of thought and approaches, the book provides a comprehensive analysis of the conditions, mechanisms and normative implications of testimonial injustice, a term most prominently introduced by Fricker (2007), and the role that trust can play in fostering testimonial justice. Through the application of theories of epistemic injustice, and testimonial injustice, to new contexts and cases, including gendered violence, disability, indigenous knowledge, genocide, vaccine hesitancy and the COVID-19 pandemic, the book sheds light on the real-world significance of these philosophical concepts.
Testimonial Injustice and Trust introduces new directions for further research and will appeal to scholars and students in (critical) social and political epistemology, normative ethics as well as social and political philosophy more generally. The chapters in this book were originally published in the International Journal of Philosophical Studies, Social Epistemology and Educational Philosophy and Theory.
Contents
Introduction: Themes from Testimonial Injustice and Trust Part I. Rethinking Testimonial Injustice 1. Can the Demands of Justice Always Be Reconciled with the Demands of Epistemology? Testimonial Injustice and the Prospects of a Normative Clash 2. Silencing by Not Telling: Testimonial Void as a New Kind of Testimonial Injustice. 3. Testifying Bodies: Testimonial Injustice as Derivatization 4. Redefining the Wrong of Epistemic Injustice: The Knower as a Concrete Other and the Affective Dimension of Cognition 5. Bystander Omissions and Accountability for Testimonial Injustice 6. Just How Testimonial, Epistemic, Or Correctable Is Testimonial Injustice? Part II. Testimonial Injustice and the Question of Trust 7. Epistemic Injustice and Epistemic Trust 8. Trust, Distrust, and Testimonial Injustice 9. Social Media, Trust and the Epistemology of Prejudice Part III. The Public Spheres of Testimonial Injustice 10. Articulating Understanding: A Phenomenological Approach to Testimony on Gendered Violence 11. Representation and Epistemic Violence 12. Remembrance and Denial of Genocide: On the Interrelations of Testimonial and Hermeneutical Injustice 13. "The Local Consultant Will Not Be Credible": How Epistemic Injustice Is Experienced and Practised in Development Aid 14. Electoral Competence, Epistocracy, and Standpoint Epistemologies. A Reply to Brennan Part IV. Testimonial Injustice and Public Health 15. Institutional Opacity, Epistemic Vulnerability, and Institutional Testimonial Justice 16. Our Epistemic Duties in Scenarios of Vaccine Mistrust 17. Misunderstanding Vaccine Hesitancy 18. Epistemology and the Pandemic Lessons from an Epistemic Crisis
