The Puzzle of Clientelism : Political Discretion and Elections around the World (Elements in Political Economy)

Golden, Miriam A./ Nazrullaeva, Eugenia

Cambridge University Press（2023/02発売）

Cambridge University Press（2023/02発売）

• 製本 Paperback:紙装版/ペーパーバック版／ページ数 84 p.
• 言語 ENG
• 商品コード 9781009323215
• DDC分類 306.2

Full Description

This Element presents newly-collected cross-national data on reelection rates of lower house national legislators from almost 100 democracies around the world. Reelection rates are low/high in countries where clientelism and vote buying are high/low. Drawing on theory developed to study lobbying, the authors explain why politicians continue clientelist activities although they do not secure reelection. The Element also provides a thorough review of the last decade of literature on clientelism, which the authors define as discretionary resource distribution by political actors. The combination of novel empirical data and theoretically-grounded analysis provides a radically new perspective on clientelism. Finally, the Element suggests that clientelism evolves with economic development, assuming new forms in highly developed democracies but never entirely disappearing.

Contents

1. Introduction; 2. Dimensions of clientelism; 3. Interpretations of clientelism in existing literature; 4. Is clientelism effective? New empirical evidence; 5. An interest group interpretation of the prevalence of clientelism; 6. Rethinking clientelism and development; Appendix A - data definitions; Appendix B - data sources; References.