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基本説明
Focusing on the successful stabilization of Japanese capitalism after the Second World War, Metzler argues that the inflationary creation of credit was key to Japan's postwar success. To prove his case, Metzler explores heterodox ideas about economic life, in particular Joseph Schumpeter's realization that inflation is intrinsic to capitalist development.
Full Description
Joseph Schumpeter's conceptions of entrepreneurship, innovation, and creative destruction have been hugely influential. He pioneered the study of economic development and of technological paradigm shifts and was a forerunner of the emerging field of evolutionary economics. He is not thought of as a theorist of credit-supercharged high-speed growth, but this is what he became in postwar Japan. As Mark Metzler shows in Capital as Will and Imagination, economists and planners in postwar Japan seized upon Schumpeter's ideas and put them directly to work.
The inflationary creation of credit, as theorized by Schumpeter, was a vital but mostly unrecognized aspect of the successful stabilization of Japanese capitalism after World War II and was integral to Japan's postwar success. It also helps to explain Japan's bubble, and the global bubbles that have followed it. The heterodox analysis presented in Capital as Will and Imagination goes beyond the economic history of postwar Japan; it opens up a new view of the core circuits of modern capital in general.
Contents
Introduction: Inflation and Its ProductionsChapter 1. The Revolution in Prices
1.1 Faustian Capital / 1.2 World War I and the Political Economy of Twentieth-Century Inflation / 1.3 Postwar Stabilization / 1.4 The Great Inflation of the 1940s / 1.5 Exporting Inflation / 1.6 The Inflation Comes HomeChapter 2. Dramatis Personae
2.1 "The Schumpeter Vogue" / 2.2 At the Monetary Bonfire / 2.3 The Marxists / 2.4 The Capital Creator / 2.5 The SchumpeteriansChapter 3. What Is Capital?
3.1 When New Capital Comes onto the Stage / 3.2 The Distribution of Promises / 3.3 Credit Inflation the Mechanism of Capitalist Development / 3.4 Capital as Indication / 3.5 The Capitalist Process as an Ideal-Material CircuitChapter 4. Flows and Stores
4.1 Energy, Capital, and Debt / 4.2 Flows of Production / 4.3 Stores of Promises / 4.4 Saving Follows from Investment / 4.5 Power and PlanningChapter 5. Japanese Capitalism under Occupation
5.1 Imagining Postwar Development / 5.2 First Responses: Burning, Looting, and Printing / 5.3 The Amplification of Monetary Flows / 5.4 The Constriction of Material-Energetic Flows / 5.5 Liquidating Japanese CapitalismChapter 6. Inflation as Capital
6.1 The Ishibashi Line / 6.2 The ESB Line: "Modified Capitalism" / 6.3 Inflation and Social Leveling / 6.4 Taxation as Monetary Regulation / 6.5 The Limits of Modified CapitalismChapter 7. Interlude (Deflation)
7.1 Joseph Dodge and the Theory of Capital Restriction / 7.2 The Sphere of International Capital / 7.3 Ministers of Restriction / 7.4 "The So-Called Stabilization Panic" / 7.5 Inside Money and Outside Money / 7.6 The World Economic CrisisChapter 8. The State-Bank Complex
8.1 Banking as Economic Governance / 8.2 Superdirect Finance / 8.3 The Privatization of the Positive PolicyChapter 9. The Turning Point
9.1 A Schumpeterian Turning Point / 9.2 Social Sources of Keynesian Stabilization / 9.3 The Second Try at Global Postwar Stabilization: Some Interim Conclusions / 9.4 Dollar Capital as Divine Providence / 9.5 "Dangerous Delusions"Chapter 10. High-Speed Growth: The Schumpeterian Boom
10.1 The Restoration of the Business Cycle / 10.2 "The Postwar Is Over": The Schumpeterian Boom Begins / 10.3 Ishibashi and Ikeda: The Ascent of the Positive Policy / 10.4 The International Circuit: The External Capital ConstraintChapter 11. High-Speed Growth: Indication and Flow
11.1 The Domestic Circuit: Imagined Capital for Real Growth / 11.2 Monetary "Flows," "Leakages," and "Absorption" / 11.3 Credit Creation as Planning; Planning as Credit Creation / 11.4 The Investment Doubling PlanChapter 12. Conclusions: Credere and Debere
12.1 Norms and Exceptions / 12.2 Stocks of Debt and Debt-Destruction Crises / 12.3 Autodeflation / 12.4 Mirrors and MiraclesAppendix
Table A-1. Basic indicators of money and credit, 1868-1965
Table A-2. Credit creation and industrial investment, 1940-1965
Table A-3. Prices and wages, 1936-1965
Table A-4. Indicators of manufacturing production, 1936-1965Notes
References
Index
