Full Description
Critics of the World Trade Organization argue that its binding dispute settlement process imposes a neoliberal agenda on member states. If this is the case, why would any nation agree to participate?
Jacqueline Krikorian explores this question by examining the impact of the WTO's dispute settlement mechanism on domestic policies in the United States and Canada. She demonstrates that the WTO's ability to influence domestic arrangements has been constrained by three factors: judicial deference, institutional arrangements, and strategic decision making by political elites in Ottawa and Washington.
By bringing the insights of law and politics scholarship to bear on a subject matter traditionally addressed by international relations scholars, Krikorian shows that the classic division in political science between these two fields of study, though suitable in the postwar era, is outdated in the context of a globalized world.
Contents
1 Judicial Review and the WTO
2 Courts and Public Policy Making
3 The Legalization of the GATT Trading Regime
4 The Establishment of the WTO Dispute Settlement Mechanism
5 Washington, Ottawa, and the WTO Agreement
6 The United States and the WTO
7 The United States, Trade Remedies, and the WTO
8 Canada and the WTO
9 The Impact of the WTO Dispute Settlement Mechanism on Domestic Law and Policy
Table of Authorities
Table of Cases
Notes
Select Bibliography
Index
