Full Description
The advent of nuclear weapons in the 1940s brought enormous changes to doctrines regarding the use of force in resolving disputes. American strategists have been widely credited with most of these; Canadians, most have assumed, did not conduct their own strategic analysis. Avoiding Armageddon soundly debunks this notion.
Drawing on previously classified government records, Richter reveals that Canadian defence officials did come to independent strategic understandings of the most critical issues of the nuclear age. Canadian appreciation of deterrence, arms control, and strategic stability differed conceptually from the US models. Similarly, Canadian thinking on the controversial issues of air defence and the domestic acquisition of nuclear weapons was primarily influenced by decidedly Canadian interests.
Avoiding Armageddon is a work with far-reaching implications. It illustrates Canada's considerable latitude for independent defence thinking while providing key historical information that helps make sense of the contemporary Canadian defence debate.
Contents
Preface
Introduction
1 The Defence and Security Environment, 1945-9
2 Canada's Air Defence Debate
3 Canadian Views on Nuclear Weapons and Related Issues of Strategy
4 The Canadian Debate on the Acquisition of Nuclear Weapons
5 Canadian Conceptual Understanding of Arms Control
6 Links between Canadian Strategic Thinking and Defence Policy, 1950-63
Conclusion
Notes
Selected Bibliography
Index
