Full Description
A Defense of Ignorance develops new ideas in feminist epistemology by exploring diverse and sometimes positive roles for ignorance. Cynthia Townley argues that epistemic values cannot simply be reduced to the value of increasing knowledge and that ignorance is not merely inescapable for epistemic agents, but, rather, is valuable. Townley shows that ignorance-friendly epistemology offers a better descriptive and normative account of human epistemic practices. This interpretation challenges the traditional assumption that increasing knowledge is the definitive epistemic goal. The book makes a major contribution to revisionary epistemology and to the expanding fields of social epistemology and feminist epistemology. All social scientists stand to benefit from Townley's analysis, most of all those interested in knowledge and in feminist scholarship.
Contents
Chapter 1 Preface
Chapter 2 Introduction: Ignorance Matters
Chapter 3 Chapter 1. Epistemic Dependence: Beyond Facts
Chapter 4 Chapter 2. Trust and Ignorance
Chapter 5 Chapter 3. Institutional Epistemic Dependence
Chapter 6 Chapter 4. Ignorance, Arrogance and Pluralism
