- ホーム
- > 洋書
- > 英文書
- > Philosophy
Full Description
In a wide-ranging inquiry Richard W. Miller provides new resources for coping with the most troubling types of moral conflict: disagreements in moral conviction, conflicting interests, and the tension between conscience and desires. Drawing on most fields in philosophy and the social sciences, including his previous work in the philosophy of science, he presents an account of our access to moral truth, and, within this framework, develops a theory of justice and an assessment of the role of morality in rational choice. In Miller's view, we are often in a position to claim that our moral judgments are true descriptions of moral facts. But others, relying on contrary ways of moral learning, would reject truths that we are in a position to assert, in dissent that does not depend on irrationality or ignorance of relevant evidence or arguments. With this mixed verdict on "moral realism," Miller challenges many received views of rationality, scientific method, and the relation between moral belief and moral choice.
In his discussion of justice, Miller defends the adequacy, for modern political choices, of a widely shared demand that institutions be freely and rationally acceptable to all. Drawing on social research and economic theories, he argues that this demand has dramatically egalitarian consequences, even though it is a premise of liberals and conservatives alike. In the final chapters, Miller investigates the role and limits of morality in the choice of conduct, arguing for new perspectives on reason and impartiality. Originally published in 1992. The Princeton Legacy Library uses the latest print-on-demand technology to again make available previously out-of-print books from the distinguished backlist of Princeton University Press. These editions preserve the original texts of these important books while presenting them in durable paperback and hardcover editions. The goal of the Princeton Legacy Library is to vastly increase access to the rich scholarly heritage found in the thousands of books published by Princeton University Press since its founding in 1905.
Contents
AcknowledgmentsAbbreviationsIntroduction3IThe Motivation for The Theory of Demonstration7IIThe Approach to the Principles21IIIThe Kinds of Principles36IVThe Subject Genus50VThe Subordinate Sciences64VIAxioms or Common Principles68VIIDefinitions, I: The Per Se80VIIIScientific Essences103IXDefinitions, II: Form and Content111XExistence Claims122XIAristotle's Principles and Greek Mathematics133XIIAristotle's Demonstrations and Euclid's Elements144XIIIThe Varieties of Demonstration, I: Universal Subject-Attribute Demonstrations164XIVThe Varieties of Demonstration, II: Application Arguments177XVThe Varieties of Demonstration, III: Demonstrations of Existence188XVIDemonstration of Essence: Another Form of Scientific Proof?198XVIIScientific Explanation209XVIIIOur Knowledge of the Principles235Notes273Bibliography309Index Locorum321General Index335
