制約された裁判所：アメリカの法、政治と司法判断 The Constrained Court : Law, Politics, and the Decisions Justices Make

Bailey, Michael A./ Maltzman, Forrest

Princeton University Press（2011/09発売）

• 製本 Paperback:紙装版/ペーパーバック版／ページ数 216 p.
• 言語 ENG
• 商品コード 9780691151052
• DDC分類 347.732634

基本説明

Showing how law and politics interact in the construction of American law.

Full Description

How do Supreme Court justices decide their cases? Do they follow their policy preferences? Or are they constrained by the law and by other political actors? The Constrained Court combines new theoretical insights and extensive data analysis to show that law and politics together shape the behavior of justices on the Supreme Court. Michael Bailey and Forrest Maltzman show how two types of constraints have influenced the decision making of the modern Court. First, Bailey and Maltzman document that important legal doctrines, such as respect for precedents, have influenced every justice since 1950. The authors find considerable variation in how these doctrines affect each justice, variation due in part to the differing experiences justices have brought to the bench. Second, Bailey and Maltzman show that justices are constrained by political factors. Justices are not isolated from what happens in the legislative and executive branches, and instead respond in predictable ways to changes in the preferences of Congress and the president. The Constrained Court shatters the myth that justices are unconstrained actors who pursue their personal policy preferences at all costs.
By showing how law and politics interact in the construction of American law, this book sheds new light on the unique role that the Supreme Court plays in the constitutional order.

Contents

Preface ix Chapter 1. Introduction 1 Chapter 2. The Measure of Law: Estimating Preferences across Institutions and Time 17 Part I. Legal Value Constraints Chapter3. Disentangling Law and Policy Preferences 47 Chapter 4. Law Matters 64 Chapter 5. Causes and Consequences of Diverse Legal Values 80 Part II. Political Constraints Chapter 6. Separation of Powers and the Strategic Constraint 95 Chapter 7. Signals from the Executive 121 Chapter 8. Conclusion 140 Appendix. Statistical Details 156 Notes 175 References 185 Index 203