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基本説明
Reveals how targeting individual leaders for punishment rather than the nations they represent creates incentives for cooperation between nations and leaves room for future relations with pariah states.
Full Description
When the United States invaded Iraq, President Bush made it clear: the U.S. was not fighting the Iraqi people. Rather, all quarrels were solely with Iraq's leadership. This kind of assertion remains frequent in foreign affairs--sanctions or military actions are imposed on a nation not because of its people, but because of its misguided leaders. Although the distinction might seem pedantic since the people suffer regardless, Punishing the Prince reveals how targeting individual leaders for punishment rather than the nations they represent creates incentives for cooperation between nations and leaves room for future relations with pariah states. Punishing the Prince demonstrates that theories of leader punishment explain a great deal about international behavior and interstate relations. The book examines the impact that domestic political institutions have on whether citizens hold their leaders accountable for international commitments and shows that the degrees to which citizens are able to remove leaders shape the dynamics of interstate relations and leader turnover.
Through analyses of sovereign debt, international trade, sanctions, and crisis bargaining, Fiona McGillivray and Alastair Smith also uncover striking differences in patterns of relations between democratic and autocratic states. Bringing together a vast body of information, Punishing the Prince offers new ways of thinking about international relations.
Contents
List of Illustrations ix List of Tables xi Preface xiii Chapter 1: We Have No Quarrel with the People 1 Leader Specifi c Punishments and Interstate Relations 3 Proper Nouns in International Relations 12 International Cooperation 15 Chapter 2: A Theory of Leader Specifi c Punishments 31 A Stochastic Prisoners' Dilemma with Leader Mortality 33 A Continuous Choice Prisoners' Dilemma 50 Appendix 65 Chapter 3: Political Institutions, Policy Variability, and the Survival of Leaders 77 Leader Survival 77 Selectorate Politics 79 Selectorate Institutions, Policy Choice, and Leader Survival 80 Policy Variability and the Turnover of Leaders 83 Chapter 4: Leader Specifi c Strategies in Human Subject Experiments 89 Human Subject Experiments 90 Results 93 Conclusions 101 Chapter 5: International Trade, Institutions, and Leader Change 109 Data 111 Setup of Econometric Tests and Model Specifi cation 115 Results 119 Conclusions 140 Chapter 6: Putting the Sovereign Back into Sovereign Debt 142 Institutions, Credibility, and Explanations of Debt 143 Modeling the Debt Repayment 145 Data 154 Debt, Repayment, and Leader Replacement 157 Conclusions 172 Chapter 7: Confl ictual Interactions 173 International Crises 173 Economic Sanctions 182 Chapter 8: Positive Political Theory and Policy 190 Building Trust and Cooperation 190 Positive Political Theory or Policy Advice? 192 Conclusions 199 Bibliography 201 Index 217
