弱小国家が戦争に勝つ理由：非対称的紛争の理論 How the Weak Win Wars : A Theory of Asymmetric Conflict (Cambridge Studies in International Relations)

Arreguín-Toft, Ivan

Cambridge University Press（2005/12発売）

• 製本 Hardcover:ハードカバー版／ページ数 276 p.
• 言語 ENG
• 商品コード 9780521839761
• DDC分類 355.42

基本説明

Argues that although many factors affect asymmetric conflict outcomes (for example the relative power of the actors, their weapons technology, outside support), the interaction of each actor's strategy is the best explanation.

Full Description

How do the weak win wars? The likelihood of victory and defeat in asymmetric conflicts depends on the interaction of the strategies weak and strong actors use. Using statistical and in-depth historical analyses of conflicts spanning two hundred years, in this 2005 book Ivan Arregúin-Toft shows that, independent of regime type and weapons technology, the interaction of similar strategic approaches favors strong actors, while opposite strategic approaches favors the weak. This approach to understanding asymmetric conflicts allows us to makes sense of how the United States was able to win its war in Afghanistan (2002) in a few months, while the Soviet Union lost after a decade of brutal war (1979-89). Arreguín-Toft's strategic interaction theory has implications not only for international relations theory, but for policy makers grappling with interstate and civil wars, as well as terrorism.

Contents

List of figures; Preface; Acknowledgements; List of abbreviations; 1. Introduction; 2. Explaining asymmetric conflict outcomes; 3. Russia in the Caucasus: the Murid War, 1830-59; 4. Britain in Orange Free State and Transvaal: the South African War, 1899-1902; 5. Italy in Ethiopia: the Italo-Ethiopian War, 1935-40; 6. The United States in Vietnam: the Vietnam War, 1965-73; 7. The USSR in Afghanistan: the Afghan Civil War, 1979-89; 8. Conclusion; Appendix; References; Index.