Presidents and Assemblies : Constitutional Design and Electoral Dynamics

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Presidents and Assemblies : Constitutional Design and Electoral Dynamics

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  • 製本 Hardcover:ハードカバー版/ページ数 316 p.
  • 言語 ENG
  • 商品コード 9780521419628
  • DDC分類 320.404

Full Description


In recent years renewed attention has been directed to the importance of the role of institutional design in democratic politics. Particular interest has concerned constitutional design and the relative merits of parliamentary versus presidential systems. In this book, the authors systematically assess the strengths and weaknesses of various forms of presidential systems, drawing on recent developments in the theoretical literature about institutional design and electoral rules. They develop a typology of democratic regimes structured around the separation of powers principle, including two hybrid forms, the premier-presidential and president-parliamentary systems, and they evaluate a number of alternative ways of balancing powers between the branches within these basic frameworks. They also demonstrate that electoral rules are critically important in determining how political authority is exercised.

Table of Contents

Part I. Presidential and Parliamentary
Democracy: 1. Basic choices in democratic
regime types
2. What is presidentialism? Criticisms and
responses
3. The constitutional origin and survival of
assembly and executive
4. Legislative powers of presidents: veto and
decree
Part II. Electoral Dynamics of Presidential
Democracy: 5. Electoral dynamics: efficiency
and inefficiency
6. Electoral rules and the party system
7. Electoral cycles and the party system
Part III. Institutiona: Engineering: 8.
Semi-presidentialism: the third alternative
9. Electoral cycles in semi-presidential regimes
10. Divided polities and collegial presidencies
11. Conclusions
Appendices.