Black Hole Tariffs and Endogenous Policy Theory : Political Economy in General Equilibrium

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Black Hole Tariffs and Endogenous Policy Theory : Political Economy in General Equilibrium

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  • 製本 Hardcover:ハードカバー版
  • 言語 ENG,ENG
  • 商品コード 9780521362474
  • DDC分類 382.70973

Full Description


This book provides a special interest theory of protection, developing a full general equilibrium theory that explains the distribution of income with goods markets, factor markets, lobbies, political parties, and voters all pursuing their self interest. This probabilistic voting model shows how well-organized groups can use seemingly irrational government policies to exploit poorly organized groups. Given rational predatory behaviour between these groups, protection or any other redistributive policy that improves the chances of election of a party increases political efficiency. This can create an economic black hole, conditions under which an entire economy can disappear into lobbying. Paradoxically, the tariff rates accompanying an economic black hole are very low. The economic waste is confined to lobbying costs. The book contains both theoretical and empirical work explaining protection in the United States (1900-88) and levels of protection in about sixty foreign countries in the 1980s.

Table of Contents

Preface
Acknowledgments
list of results
1. A preview of the results
2. Endogenous policy theory: a diagrammatic
approach
Part I. Endogenous Policy Theory with Specific
Factors: The Theory of Industry Tariffs in
Partial Equilibrium: 3. The probabilistic
voting model of political efficiency and
powerless politicians
4. Endogenous lobbying theory and the
contribution specialization theorem
5. Endogenous tariff theory
6. The power function model of endogenous
industry lobbying
7. Three simple tests of the Stolper-Samuelson
theorem
8. The invisible foot and the waste of nations:
lawyers as negative externalities
Part II. Endogenous Policy Theory in General
Equilibrium: A Long-Run Theory of National
Tariff Levels: 9. The 2 x 2 x 2 x 2 model of
endogenous redistribution theory
10. A prisoner's dilemma theory of endogenous
protection: the Leontief model
11. The compensation effect and the multiple
equilibrium trap
12. increasing returns to politics and factor
endowments: economic development and Brazilian
vitality versus the Indian disease
13. Endogenous protection in the United States,
1900-1988
14. A Cobb-Douglas model
15. Black hole tariffs
116. The endowment effect: cross-national
evidence on endogenous tariffs
Part II. Postscript: 17. The senile-industry
argument for protection
18. Optimal obfuscation and the theory of the
second worst: the politically efficient policy
Mathematical appendices
References
Author index
Subject index.