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基本説明
New in paperback. Hardcover was published in 1990. The topics covered are: spatial competition with possible entry by new candidates; the "heresthetical" manipulation of vote outcomes; candidates with policy preferences; experimental testing of spatial models; probabilistic voting; voting on alternatives with predictive power; elections with more than two candidates under different election systems; and agenda-setting behavior in voting.
Full Description
This volume brings together eight original essays selected to provide an overview of the developments in the spatial theory of voting. The spatial theory of self-interest and explores the consequences of this assumption for elite behaviour and for the choices voters make in representative and direct democracies. The book summarizes work in eight major areas: elections with possible entry by new candidates who have policy preferences, experimental testing of spatial models of committees and elections, elections with imperfect information about voting intentions, voting on alternatives that are linked to future decisions, elections with candidates who have policy preferences, experimental testing of spatial manoeuvres designed to alter voting outcomes, elections with experimental testing of spatial models of committees and elections, elections with imperfect information about voting intentions, voting on alternatives that are linked to future decisions, elections with more than two candidates under different election rules, and bureaucratic efforts to manipulate referendum voting. Recognized scholars in these areas summarize the major results of their own and others' work, providing self-contained discussions that will apprise readers of important recent advances.
Contents
Foreword; 1. Introduction James M. Enelow and Melvin J. Hinich; 2. Multiparty competition, entry, and entry deterrence in spatial models of elections Kenneth A. Shepsle and Ronald N. Cohen; 3. Heresthetic and rhetoric in the spatial model William H. Riker; 4. Spatial strategies when candidates have policy preferences Donald Wittman; 5. A decade of experimental research on spatial models of elections and committees Richard D. McKelvey and Peter C. Ordeshook; 6. Candidate uncertainty and electoral equilibria Peter J. Coughlin; 7. The theory of predictive mappings James M. Enelow and Melvin J. Hinich; 8. Multicandidate spatial competition Gary W. Cox; 9. The setter model Howard Rosenthal; Author index; Subject index.
