Full Description
The Crimea, the Boer War, the Somme, Tobruk, Pearl Harbor, the Bay of Pigs: these are just some of the milestones in a century of military incompetence, of costly mishaps and tragic blunders. Are these simple accidents--as the "bloody fool" theory has it--or are they inevitable? The psychologist Norman F. Dixon argues that there is a pattern to inept generalship, and locates this pattern within the very act of creating armies in the first place, which in his view produces a levelling down of human capability that encourages the mediocre and limits the gifted. In this light, successful generals achieve what they do despite the stultifying features of the organization to which they belong. A classic study of military leadership, On the Psychology of Military Incompetence is at once an original exploration of the battles that have defined the last two centuries of human civilization and an essential guide for the next generation of military leaders.
Contents
1. Introduction PART ONE 2. Generalship 3. The Crimean War 4. The Boer War 5. Indian Interlude 6. The First World War 7. Cambrai 8. The Siege of Kut 9. Between the Wars 10. The Second World War 11. Singapore 12. Arnhem PART TWO 13. Is There a Case to Answer? 14. The Intellectual Ability of Senior Military Commanders 15. Military Organizations 16. 'Bullshit' 17. Socialization and the Anal Character 18. Character and Honour 19. Anti-Effeminacy 20. Leaders of Men 21. Military Achievement 22. Authoritarianism 23. Mothers of Incompetence 24. Education and the Cult of Muscular Christianity PART THREE 25. Individual Differences 26. Extremes of Authoritarianism 27. The Worst and the Best 28. Exceptions to the Rule? 29. Retreat
