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Full Description
This volume explores the connections between the phenomenology of self-awareness and the metaphysical nature of subjects of experience, bringing together two important research areas in contemporary philosophy of mind into fruitful engagement with one another.
The phenomenology of self-awareness concerns what it is like to be aware of oneself in various conscious experiences such as perceiving, recollecting, experiencing agency, or emotions. The metaphysical nature of subjects of experience raises questions concerning whether subjects are physical or non-physical entities, whether they are substances or bundles of properties, and what it is for subjects to have experiences. The ten original essays in this volume are grouped into thematic sections covering the following topics: the nature of self-awareness and its relation to conscious experience, the metaphysical nature of the subject of experience, and whether self-awareness can reveal anything about the metaphysical nature of the subject. Each essay is accompanied by comments from another contributor to the volume and a response from the author.
The Phenomenology of Self-Awareness and the Nature of Conscious Subjects will appeal to researchers and advanced students working in analytic philosophy of mind.
Contents
Introduction: Self-Experience and the Metaphysics of Conscious Subjects Part 1: Self-Awareness and Conscious Experience 1. Experience, Reflection, and Pre-Reflection 2. How to Attend to Yourself as a Subject 3. Hiding in Plain Sight? On the Elusiveness of the Self Part 2: The Metaphysical Nature of Conscious Subjects 4. The Illusion of the Enduring Self 5. Agentive Self-Awareness and the Nature of the Conscious Self 6. The Hard Problem of the Self: A Case for Substance Dualism? 7. In Defence of Phenomenal Sharing Part 3: What Self-Awareness Reveals About the Nature of Conscious Subjects 8. What is it for an Experience to Belong to a Subject? A Phenomenological Argument for the Simple View 9. What Self-Acquaintance Says About Us 10. Persistence of Persons: Limits of a First-Personal Criterion
