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Full Description
The progress of society can only happen through interpersonal cooperation, because only cooperation can bring about mutual benefit, thus bringing happiness to each person. This should be our collective rationality, but we often see it conflicts with individual interests, which leads to the so-called "Prisoners' Dilemma" and does not bring happiness to all.
From a game theoretical perspective, this book addresses the issue of how people can cooperate better. It has two objectives. The first is to use common language to systematically introduce the basic methodologies and core conclusions of Game Theory, including the Nash equilibrium, multiple equilibriums, dynamic games, etc. Mathematics and theoretical models are used to the minimum necessary scope too, to make this book get access to ordinary readers with elementary mathematical training. The second objective is to utilize these methods and conclusions to analyze various Chinese social issues and institutional arrangements, with a focus on the reasons people exhibit non-cooperative behaviors as well as the institutions and cultures that promote interpersonal cooperation.
In addition to economics, specialists in sociology, law, history, politics and management will also be attracted by this book for its insightful analysis on the issue of cooperation in these fields. Also, readers curious about Chinese society will benefit from this book.
Contents
List of figures. List of tables. Foreword to the Chinese Edition Chapter 1 Individual Rationality and Social Optimum Chapter 2 The Nash Equilibrium and the Prisoners' Dilemma Game Chapter 3 Multiple Equilibriums, Institutions, and Cultures Chapter 4 Threats and Commitments Chapter 5 Bargaining and Patience Chapter 6 Repeated Games and Cooperative Behavior Chapter 7 Incomplete Information and Reputation Chapter 8 Adverse Selection, Brands, and Regulation Chapter 9 Signaling and Social Norms Chapter 10 Mechanism Design and Income Distribution Chapter 11 Moral Hazard and Corruption Chapter 12 Evolutionary Games and the Spontaneous Order Chapter 13 Laws and Social Norms Chapter 14 Institutional Entrepreneurs and the Rules of the Game References. Index
