Paying for the Party : How Fundraising Demands Lead to Less Productive and Less Representative Legislatures (Chicago Studies in American Politics)

個数：

予約

Paying for the Party : How Fundraising Demands Lead to Less Productive and Less Representative Legislatures (Chicago Studies in American Politics)

Kistner, Michael R.

ウェブストア価格 ¥6,758（本体¥6,144）
University of Chicago Press（2026/06発売）
外貨定価 US$ 30.00
ポイント 61pt

現在予約受付中です。出版後の入荷・発送となります。
（重要：表示されている発売日は予定となり、発売が延期、中止、生産限定品で商品確保ができないなどの理由により、ご注文をお取消しさせていただく場合がございます。予めご了承ください。）

●3Dセキュア導入とクレジットカードによるお支払いについて

【入荷遅延について】
世界情勢の影響により、海外からお取り寄せとなる洋書・洋古書の入荷が、表示している標準的な納期よりも遅延する場合がございます。
おそれいりますが、あらかじめご了承くださいますようお願い申し上げます。

◆画像の表紙や帯等は実物とは異なる場合があります。

◆ウェブストアでの洋書販売価格は、弊社店舗等での販売価格とは異なります。
また、洋書販売価格は、ご注文確定時点での日本円価格となります。
ご注文確定後に、同じ洋書の販売価格が変動しても、それは反映されません。

製本 Paperback:紙装版/ペーパーバック版／ページ数 208 p.
言語 ENG
商品コード 9780226850221

Full Description

A revealing, data-rich exploration of how American legislators transformed from active policymakers into party fundraisers.

Lawmakers in Congress and state legislatures across the United States spend enormous amounts of time and effort fundraising, not just for their own seats but for the party. Whether dialing for dollars or hosting high-priced fundraising events, the pursuit of campaign funds is now a massive part of the American legislator's job description. What explains this transformation, and what are the consequences for public policy?

In Paying for the Party, Michael Kistner uses new theory and new data to answer these questions. He shows that state legislative party organizations—Democratic and Republican caucuses in capitols across the country—are responsible for turning their members into single-minded seekers of money. Parties reward legislators who contribute the most with powerful leadership and committee positions. Consequently, the members who now hold these agenda-setting positions are increasingly neither the most productive nor knowledgeable lawmakers, but rather those who can raise the most money. And when legislators are asked to raise more money, they skip committee hearings for fundraising events, enacting fewer substantive policies as a result. Paying for the Party shows that parties in contemporary American legislatures have hollowed out the policymaking capacity of their institutions and empowered a decidedly non-representative set of legislators.

List of Illustrations

1. Introduction: The New Money Race

Part I: Explaining Party Fundraising
2. A Theory of Party Fundraising
3. Party Fundraising in the States
4. Who Gives, and Why?

Part II: The Consequences of Party Fundraising
5. A Theory of Fundraising and Policymaking
6. Fundraising Demands and Policy Productivity
7. Fundraising Demands and Descriptive Representation

Part III: Conclusion
8. The Future of Party Fundraising

Acknowledgments
Notes
Bibliography
Index