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Full Description
According to Russellian monism, an alternative to the familiar theories in the philosophy of mind that combines attractive components of physicalism and dualism, matter has intrinsic properties that both constitute consciousness and serve as categorical bases for the dispositional properties described in physics.
Consciousness in the Physical World collects various works on Russellian monism, including historical selections, recent classics, and new pieces. Most chapters are sympathetic with the view, but some are skeptical. Together, they constitute the first book-length treatment of the view itself, its relationship to other theories, its motivations, and its problems.
Contents
Contents ; Editors' Introduction ; Torin Alter and Yujin Nagasawa ; Part I: Precursors ; Chapter 1: Gottfried Wilhelm von Leibniz, excerpt from Monadology and letter to DeVolder ; Chapter 2: Immanuel Kant, excerpt from Critique of Pure Reason ; Chapter 3: William James, excerpt from The Principles of Psychology ; Chapter 4: Bertrand Russell, excerpts from Analysis of Matter (1927), Human Knowledge: Its Scope and Limits (1948), Portraits from Memory (1956), and My Philosophical Development (1959). ; Chapter 5: Leopold Stubenberg, "Russell, Russellian Monism, and Panpsychism" ; Chapter 6: Donovan Wishon, "Russell on Russellian Monism" ; Part III: Modern Classics and Recent Works ; Chapter 7: Grover Maxwell, "Rigid Designators and Mind-Brain Identity" (excerpt) ; Chapter 8: Michael Lockwood, "The Grain Problem" ; Chapter 9: Galen Strawson, "Real Materialism" (revised version, with postscript) ; Chapter 10: Barbara Gail Montero, "Russellian Physicalism" ; Chapter 11: Gregg Rosenberg, "Causality and the Combination Problem" ; Chapter 12: David J. Chalmers, "Panpsychism and Panprotopsychism" ; Chapter 13: Torin Alter and Robert J. Howell, "The Short Slide from A Posteriori Physicalism to Russellian Monism" ; Chapter 14: Derk Pereboom, "Consciousness, Physicalism, and Absolutely Intrinsic Properties" ; Chapter 15: Daniel Stoljar, "Russellian Monism or Nagelian Monism?" ; Chapter 16: Alyssa Ney, "A Physicalist Critique of Russellian Monism" ; Chapter 17: Philip Goff, "Against Constitutive Russellian Monism" ; Chapter 18: Amy Kind, "Pessimism about Russellian Monism" ; Chapter 19: Torin Alter and Yujin Nagasawa, "What is Russellian Monism?"
