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Full Description
Science and its philosophical companion, Naturalism, represent reality in wholly nonpersonal terms. How, if at all, can a nonpersonal scheme accommodate the first-person perspective that we all enjoy? In this volume, Lynne Rudder Baker explores that question by considering both reductive and eliminative approaches to the first-person perspective. After finding both approaches wanting, she mounts an original constructive argument to show that a nonCartesian first-person perspective belongs in the basic inventory of what exists. That is, the world that contains us persons is irreducibly personal.
After arguing for the irreducibilty and ineliminability of the first-person perspective, Baker develops a theory of this perspective. The first-person perspective has two stages, rudimentary and robust. Human infants and nonhuman animals with consciousness and intentionality have rudimentary first-person perspectives. In learning a language, a person acquires a robust first-person perspective: the capacity to conceive of oneself as oneself, in the first person. By developing an account of personal identity, Baker argues that her theory is coherent, and she shows various ways in which first-person perspectives contribute to reality.
Contents
Introduction: What is the Problem? ; The Claim of Naturalism ; A Challenge to Naturalism ; What is at Stake ; An Overview ; Part I: The Core Argument ; Ch. 1. Varieties of Naturalism ; What Counts As 'Science'? ; Reductive Naturalism ; Nonreductive Naturalism ; Disenchantment and Optimism ; Ch. 2. On Naturalizing the First-Person Perspective ; What is Naturalization? ; The Robust First-Person Perspective ; The Rudimentary First-Person Perspective ; Ch. 3. Reductive Approaches to the First-Person Perspective ; John Perry on an Epistemic Account of the Self ; David Lewis on De Se Belief ; A Comment on John Searle ; Can Cognitive Science Save the Day? ; Ch. 4. Eliminative Approaches to the First-Person Perspective ; Daniel Dennett on Consciousness ; Thomas Metzinger on a Self-Model Theory ; My Recommendation ; Ch. 5. Arguments Against First-Person Naturalization ; From First-Person Concepts to First-Person Properties ; A Linguistic Argument: A Complete Ontology Must Include First-Person Properties ; A Metaphysical Argument Against Ontological Naturalism ; Part II: An Account of the First-Person Perspective ; Ch. 6. From the Rudimentary to the Robust Stage of the First-Person Perspective ; The First-Person Perspective: Consciousness and Self-Consciousness ; Language and the Acquisition of Concepts ; How to Acquire a Self-Concept ; Human Persons: Wrap Up ; Ch. 7. Is the Idea of the First-Person Perspective Coherent? ; Personal Identity: A First-Personal Approach ; Objections and Replies ; Mark Johnston on the Self as Illusory ; Johnston's Critique Side-Stepped ; Ch. 8. A Metaphysical Framework for The First-Person Perspective ; First-Person Properties ; Dispositional Properties ; Haecceitistic Implications ; Ch. 9. Agents, Artifacts, Moral Responsibility: Some Contributions of the First-person Perspective ; Personhood ; Agency ; Artifacts ; Moral Responsibility ; Ch. 10. Natural Reality ; Near-Naturalism ; Property-Constitution and Causation ; Emergentism and Downward Causation ; How Naturalistic is Near-Naturalism? ; Index
