The Sources of Intentionality (Philosophy of Mind Series)

個数:
  • ポイントキャンペーン

The Sources of Intentionality (Philosophy of Mind Series)

  • ウェブストア価格 ¥30,487(本体¥27,716)
  • Oxford University Press Inc(2011/08発売)
  • 外貨定価 UK£ 102.50
  • 【ウェブストア限定】ブラックフライデーポイント5倍対象商品(~11/24)※店舗受取は対象外
  • ポイント 1,385pt
  • 在庫がございません。海外の書籍取次会社を通じて出版社等からお取り寄せいたします。
    通常6~9週間ほどで発送の見込みですが、商品によってはさらに時間がかかることもございます。
    重要ご説明事項
    1. 納期遅延や、ご入手不能となる場合がございます。
    2. 複数冊ご注文の場合は、ご注文数量が揃ってからまとめて発送いたします。
    3. 美品のご指定は承りかねます。

    ●3Dセキュア導入とクレジットカードによるお支払いについて
  • 【入荷遅延について】
    世界情勢の影響により、海外からお取り寄せとなる洋書・洋古書の入荷が、表示している標準的な納期よりも遅延する場合がございます。
    おそれいりますが、あらかじめご了承くださいますようお願い申し上げます。
  • ◆画像の表紙や帯等は実物とは異なる場合があります。
  • ◆ウェブストアでの洋書販売価格は、弊社店舗等での販売価格とは異なります。
    また、洋書販売価格は、ご注文確定時点での日本円価格となります。
    ご注文確定後に、同じ洋書の販売価格が変動しても、それは反映されません。
  • 製本 Hardcover:ハードカバー版/ページ数 288 p.
  • 言語 ENG
  • 商品コード 9780199742974
  • DDC分類 128.2

Full Description

What do thoughts, hopes, paintings, words, desires, photographs, traffic signs, and perceptions have in common? They are all about something, are directed, are contentful - in a way chairs and trees, for example, are not. This book inquires into the source of this power of directedness that some items exhibit while others do not. An approach to this issue prevalent in the philosophy of the past half-century seeks to explain the power of directedness in terms of certain items' ability to reliably track things in their environment. A very different approach, with a venerable history and enjoying a recent resurgence, seeks to explain the power of directedness rather in terms of an intrinsic ability of conscious experience to direct itself. This book attempts a synthesis of both approaches, developing an account of the sources of such directedness that grounds it both in reliable tracking and in conscious experience.

Contents

CONTENTS; INTRODUCTION; 1.1. THE CONCEPT OF INTENTIONALITY AND ANCHORING INSTANCES; 1.1.1. AN ANCHORING-INSTANCE MODEL OF NATURAL KIND CONCEPT FORMATION; 1.1.2. APPLICATION TO THE CONCEPT OF INTENTIONALITY; 1.2. EXPERIENTIAL INTENTIONALITY THE ANCHOR; 1.2.1. AN ASYMMETRY OF ASCRIPTION; 1.2.2. EXPLAINING THE ASYMMETRY; 1.2.3. OBJECTIONS AND REPLIES; 1.3. 'EXPERIENTIAL INTENTIONALITY'; 1.3.1. DEFINITION; 1.3.2. EXISTENCE; 1.3.3. SCOPE; 2.1. A TRACKING ACCOUNT OF EXPERIENTIAL INTENTIONALITY?; 2.1.1. BACKGROUND: TRACKING THEORIES OF MENTAL REPRESENTATION; 2.1.2. REPRESENTATIONALIST THEORIES OF CONSCIOUS EXPERIENCE; 2.1.3. EXPERIENTIAL TRACKING; 2.2. THE HOT ARGUMENT; 2.2.1. BACKGROUND: HIGHER-ORDER THEORIES OF CONSCIOUS EXPERIENCE; 2.2.2. HIGHER-ORDER THEORY AND THE TRACKING ACCOUNT OF EXPERIENTIAL INTENTIONALITY; 2.3. EXPERIENTIAL INTENTIONALITY AND HIGHER-ORDER TRACKING; 2.4. OBJECTIONS AND REPLIES; 2.4.1. 'INTENTIONALITY,' 'REPRESENTATION,' 'TRACKING'; 2.4.2. WHAT DO WE WANT A THEORY OF INTENTIONALITY FOR?; 3.1. BACKGROUND: INTENTIONAL INEXISTENCE AND INTENTIONAL INDIFFERENCE; 3.2. THE ARGUMENT FROM INTENTIONAL INDIFFERENCE; 3.2.1. THE ARGUMENT; 3.2.2. RESPONSES; 3.2.3. BRAINS IN VATS; 3.3. THE ARGUMENT FROM INTENTIONAL INEXISTENCE; 3.3.1. THE ARGUMENT; 3.3.2. RESPONSES; 3.4. EXPERIENTIAL INTENTIONALITY AS ADVERBIAL MODIFICATION; 3.5. OBJECTIONS TO ADVERBIALISM; 4.1. POTENTIALISM; 4.2. INFERENTIALISM; 4.3. ELIMINATIVISM; 4.4. INTERPRETIVISM; 4.4.1. INTERPRETIVISM ABOUT NON-EXPERIENTIAL INTENTIONALITY; 4.4.2. INTERPRETIVISM DEVELOPED; 4.4.3. OBJECTIONS AND REPLIES; 5.1. ADVERBIALISM PLUS INTERPRETIVISM; 5.2. HIGHER-ORDER TRACKING THEORY PLUS INTERPRETIVISM; REFERENCES