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Full Description
Stephen J. White (1983-2021) was developing a comprehensive view of responsibility and its limits when his life was tragically cut short. This volume contains his collected papers. White's view of responsibility spans across ethics, action theory, and interpersonal epistemology. Its core idea is that to be responsible for doing or believing something is to be answerable for why one has done it or why one believes it, and to be responsible for a state of affairs is to be answerable for why things are that way, rather than some other way. White deploys this conception of responsibility to illuminate the notions of autonomy, coercion, shared reasoning, self-prediction, doxastic wronging, and peer disagreement. He also investigates the nature of practical reasoning: he argues against a production-oriented conception of practical reasoning, delineates the scope of transmission principles in means-ends reasoning, and identifies a limited for self-prediction in practical reasoning that is subject to an anti-opportunism constraint. The papers form the outline of a deep ethical outlook that takes seriously our personal and collective responsibilities and yet leaves room for personal autonomy both in thought and in action.
Contents
PART I Responsibility
1: Standing Up For Neutrality
2: Responsibility and the Demands of Morality
3: The Centrality of One's Own Life
4: On the Moral Objection to Coercion
5: The Relevance of Formative Circumstances to Blameworthiness
6: Responsibility, Justice, and Solidarity
PART II Practical Reasoning and Action Theory
7: The Problem of Self-Torture: What's Being Done?
8: Transmission Failures
9: Intention and Prediction in Means-End Reasoning
10: Self-Prediction in Practical Reasoning: Its Role and Limits
11: Collective Obligations and the Ethics of Participation
12: Practical Commitment and Knowledge of Intentional Action: An Argument against Inferentialism
13: Action and Production
14: Unproductive Reasons
PART III Interpersonal Epistemology
15: Against Voluntarism about Doxastic Responsibility
16: (with Berislav Maru%si'c): How Can Beliefs Wrong?-A Strawsonian Epistemology
17: (with Berislav Maru%si'c): Disagreement and Alienation
