Full Description
Choice is a key concept of our time. It is a foundational mechanism for every legal order in societies that are, politically, constituted as democracies and, economically, built on the market mechanism. Thus, choice can be understood as an atomic structure that grounds core societal processes. In recent years, however, the debate over the right way to theorize choice - for example, as a rational or a behavioral type of decision making - has intensified.
This collection provides an in-depth discussion of the promises and perils of specific types of theories of choice. It shows how the selection of a specific theory of choice can make a difference for concrete legal questions, in particular in the regulation of the digital economy or in choosing between market, firm, or network. In its first part, the volume provides an accessible overview of the current debates about rational versus behavioral approaches to theories of choice. The remainder of the book structures the vast landscape of theories of choice along with three main types: individual, collective, and organizational decision making.
As theories of choice proliferate and become ever more sophisticated, however, the process of choosing an adequate theory of choice becomes increasingly intricate. This volume addresses this selection problem for the various legal arenas in which individual, organizational, and collective decisions matter. By drawing on economic, technological, political, and legal points of view, the volume shows which theories of choice are at the disposal of the legally relevant decision-maker, and how they can be operationalized for the solution of concrete legal problems.
The editors acknowledge the kind support of the Fritz Thyssen Foundation for an exploratory conference on the subject of the book.
Contents
Stefan Grundmann and Philipp Hacker: Theories of Choice and the Law - An Introduction
Part I: Foundations
1: Christoph Engel: The Proper Scope of Behavioural Law and Economics
2: Simon Deakin: Rational Choice and its Limits for the Solution and Legal Problems: Three Observations on Behavioural Law and Economics
3: Marlies Ahlert: Game Theory and the Law: Incomplete Knowledge About the Knowledge of Other Players
Part II: Individual Choice and the Law
4: Lucia A. Reisch, Cass R. Substein and Micha Keiser: Most People Like Nudges - And Why That Matters
5: Philipp Hacker: Regulating Under Uncertainty About Rationality: From Decision Theory to Machine Learning and Complexity Theory
6: Anne-Lise Sibony: Did You Say 'Theories of Choice'?: On the Limited and Variable Appetite for Theories in Consumer Law
Part III: Collective Choice and the Law
7: Adrienne Heritier: Itinera Europea: Four Scenarios and their Plausibility
8: Matthew D. Adler: The Social Welfare Function: A New Tool for Regulatory Policy Analysis
9: Andreas Engert: Collective Intelligence: Crowd Wisdom Versus Herding
Part IV: Organizational Choice and the Law
A. Firms
10: Julian Velasco: Decision Theory and Allocation Decision Making in the Firm
11: Luca Enriques and Alessandro Romano: Institutional Investor Voting Behaviour: A Network Theory Perspective
B. Institutions, Networks, and Courts
12: Genevieve Helleringer: Conflict of Interest and Decision-Making
13: Stefan Grundmann: Decision Making in Chains and Networks of Contracts
14: Christopher Brett Jaeger and Jennifer S. Trueblood: The Power of Sequence: A Quantum Perspective on Legal Decision Making
