Full Description
Courts, Regulators, and the Scrutiny of Economic Evidence presents the first systematic examination of economic regulation and the crucial role of economic evidence in regulatory authorities and courts.
This book brings together strands of scholarship from law, economics, and political science to explore two key themes: the influence of economic evidence on the discretionary assessments of economic regulators, and the limits of judicial review of economic evidence, supplemented with comparative examination of both UK and US systems. In light of the challenges posed by economic evidence, Mantzari argues the appropriate scope of judicial review in the era of regulatory economics, and what the optimal institutional response to the pervasiveness of economic evidence in regulation should be.
Building on comparative institutional analysis, this book rejects single-factor explanations, such as the individual knowledge of judges, in favour of a richer set of macro and micro-level factors that shape the relationships between courts and regulators. Mantzari argues that the 'recipe' for adjudicating economic evidence requires a balance in which a degree of epistemic diversity is introduced in courts, and deference is accorded to regulatory agencies on grounds of institutional competency.
The book combines theoretical, doctrinal, comparative, and empirical analysis and it is written to be accessible to lawyers, economists, judges, regulators, policymakers, and political scientists.
Contents
1: Introduction
2: Unpacking Economic Evidence
3: Imperfect Alternatives: Actors and Processes for the Review of Economic Evidence in the US and the UK
4: Transforming Discretion
5: From 'Hard Look Review' to 'Thin Rationality' review: The US Courts' Response to Economic Evidence
6: The Institutional Response: Judicial Scrutiny of Economic Evidence at the UK Competition Appeal Tribunal
7: Towards a Complementary Relationship between the Court and the Regulatory Agency in the Realm of Utility Regulation
8: Epilogue
