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Full Description
Democracy has many attractive features. Among them is its tendency to track the truth, at least under certain idealized assumptions. That basic result has been known since 1785, when Condorcet published his famous jury theorem. But that theorem has typically been dismissed as little more than a mathematical curiosity, with assumptions too restrictive for it to apply to the real world. In An Epistemic Theory of Democracy, Goodin and Spiekermann propose different ways of interpreting voter independence and competence to make jury theorems more generally applicable. They go on to assess a wide range of familiar political practices and alternative institutional arrangements, to determine what constellation of them might most fully exploit the truth-tracking potential of majoritarian democracy. The book closes with a discussion of how epistemic democracy might be undermined, using as case studies the Trump and Brexit campaigns.
Contents
1: Introduction
Part I: The Condorcet Jury Theorem
2: The Classic Framework
3: Extensions
4: Limitations
5: Independence Revisited
Part II: Epistemic Enhancement
6: Improving Individual Competence
7: Diversity
8: Division of Epistemic Labour
9: Discussion and Deliberation
Part III: Political Practices
10: Respecting Tradition
11: Following Leaders
12: Taking Cues
13: Pluralism: Differing Values & Priorities
14: Factionalism: Differing Interests
Part IV: Structures of Government
15: Epistocracy or Democracy
16: Direct versus Representative Democracy
17: Institutional Hindrances to Epistemic Success
18: Institutional Aids to Epistemic Success
Part V: Conclusions
19: The Relation Between Truth and Politics, Once Again
20: Headline Findings, Central Implications
21: Epilogue: What About Trump and Brexit?
Appendices
A1: Key to Notation
A2: Estimating Group Competence by Monte Carlo Simulation
