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Full Description
The definitive work on the course, conduct, and aftermath of the Iraq war.
In Death, Dominance, and State-Building, the eminent scholar of conflict Roger D. Petersen provides the first comprehensive analytic history of post-invasion Iraq. Although the war is almost universally derided as one of the biggest foreign policy blunders of the post-Cold War era, Petersen argues that the course and conduct of the conflict is poorly understood. He begins by outlining an accessible framework for analyzing complex, fluid, and violent internal conflicts. He then applies that framework to a variety of diverse case studies to break down the strategic interplay among the US military forces and Shia and Sunni insurgent organizations as it played out in Baghdad, Anbar, and Hawija. Highlighting the struggle for dominance between Shia and Sunni in Baghdad, Petersen offers a reconsideration of the Surge. He also addresses failures of state-building in Iraqi Kurdistan. Critically, he shows how the legacy of the US occupation and presence from 2003-2011 shaped Iraq's political and security contours from 2011-2023.
Comprehensive, analytically sophisticated, and subtle, this book draws lessons relevant to future American military interventions from what most regard as the US's most disastrous foreign policy adventure since Vietnam. The US cannot simply wish away insurgencies, which are always going to occur. The question is what the US and other great powers might do about them in the future.
Contents
Section One: Framework
Chapter One: Death, Dominance, and State-Building: The US in Iraq and the Future of American Intervention
Chapter Two: Analytical Framework I: Roles and Strategy
Chapter Three: Analytical Framework II: Mechanisms and Strategy
Chapter Four: US Counterinsurgency Strategy and Practice
Section Two: The Iraq Conflict 2003-2011
Preview to Section II
Chapter Five: Violence, State-Building, and the Sunni-Shia Cleavage
Chapter Six: Ghazaliyah: Sunni Mobilization, Sectarian War, US Success and Failure
Chapter Seven: Sadr City, the Mahdi Army, and the Sectarian Cleansing of Baghdad
Chapter Eight: Mansour: The Failure to Mobilize Moderates
Chapter Nine: The Failure to Establish Local Security
Chapter Ten: Captain Wright Goes to Baghdad (co-written with Timothy Wright)
Chapter Eleven: Anbar, 2003-2011: The Generation of a Community Mobilization Strategy (co-written with Jon Lindsay)
Chapter Twelve: The Battle of Sadr City, 2008: Innovations in Urban Counterinsurgency
Chapter Thirteen: The Surge: A Reconsideration
Chapter Fourteen: Iraqi Kurdistan: Dual Cleavages and their Effect on War and State-Building
Section Three: Iraq 2011-2020
Preview to Section III
Chapter Fifteen: Hawija: Explaining Sunni Resurgence
Chapter Sixteen: The Third Iraq War
Chapter Seventeen: Hybrid Actors: The Emergence and Persistence of the Popular Mobilization Forces
Chapter Eighteen: How Minorities Make Their Way in Post-ISIS Iraq: The Case of Christian Militias in the Nineveh Plain (co-written with Matt Cancian)
Chapter Nineteen: The Kurdistan Regional Governate Revisited: Death, War, Machinations, and Little Change
Chapter Twenty: The Decline of Dominance Politics? Emotions and Institutions in Iraq Ten Years After the 2011 US Withdrawal
Section Four: The Future of American Military Intervention
Preview to Section IV
Chapter Twenty-One: Findings and Lessons
Chapter Twenty-Two: Constraints on Learning: The Influence of the Changing International System and US Domestic Politics
Chapter Twenty-Three: The Future of American Military Intervention
Appendices:
Appendix A: Application of Framework to Classic Theories of Insurgency and Counterinsurgency
Appendix B: An Application of the Framework to Review Recent Social Science Literature
Bibliography
Notes
Index
