基本説明
Considers debates about how intrusive antitrust authorities should be in regulating market economies; and introduces antitrust insiitutions in the U.S., the European Union, and other jurisdictions.
Full Description
The Institutional Structure of Antitrust Enforcement, by Daniel A. Crane provides a comprehensive and succinct treatment of the history, structure, and behavior of the various U.S. institutions that enforce antitrust laws, such as the Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission. It addresses the relationship between corporate regulation and antitrust, the uniquely American approach of having two federal antitrust agencies, antitrust federalism, and the predominance of private enforcement over public enforcement. It also draws comparisons with the structure of institutional enforcement outside the United States in the European Union and in other parts of the world, and it considers the possibility of creating international antitrust institutions through the World Trade Organization or other treaty mechanisms. The book derives its topics from historical, economic, political, and theoretical perspectives.
Contents
Acknowledgments ; Introduction ; Part I - Origins and Development of U.S. Antitrust Institutions ; Chapter One: Antifederalism and Corporate Regulation ; Chapter Two: The Curious Case of Dual Federal Enforcement ; Chapter Three: Private Enforcement: Growth and Backlash ; Chapter Four: Shifting Towards Technocracy ; Part II - Optimizing Institutional Performance ; Chapter Five: Adjudication, Regulation, and Administration ; Chapter Six. The Much-Maligned Antitrust Jury ; Chapter Seven: Improving Public Enforcement ; Chapter Eight: State Enforcement and Federal Preemption ; Chapter Nine: Rethinking Private Enforcement ; Part III - Comparative and International Perspectives ; Chapter Ten: How and Why is Europe Different? ; Chapter Eleven: Emerging Antitrust Institutions Around the World ; Chapter Twelve: Toward International Antitrust Institutions? ; Index
