History in Dispute : World War I : First Series (History in Dispute) 〈8〉

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History in Dispute : World War I : First Series (History in Dispute) 〈8〉

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  • 製本 Hardcover:ハードカバー版/ページ数 350 p.
  • 言語 ENG,ENG
  • 商品コード 9781558624146
  • DDC分類 909

Table of Contents

About the Series                                   xiii
Preface xv
Dennis Showalter
Chronology xxi
Alienation of Soldiers: Did soldiers who had 1 (9)
fought at the front feel permanently
alienated from civilian culture?
Yes. The conditions of the fighting and the 2 (4)
remoteness of many theaters combined to
establish a barrier of understanding
between those who fought and those who did
not
Paul Du Quenoy
No. The myth that front-line soldiers were 6 (4)
alienated from homefront society is based
on the experience of a small, vocal group
H. B. McCartney
American Military Independence: Was U.S. 10 (11)
insistence on maintaining military
independence a decisive element in the Allied
victory?
Yes. Military independence allowed the 11 (3)
American forces to defend Paris
successfully in the summer of 1918 and to
spearhead the decisive counteroffensive in
September of the same year
Paul Du Quenoy
No. American troops performed poorly under 14 (4)
their own officers, and the Allied victory
can be attributed simply to the American
role in introducing two million fresh
troops at a time when the Central Powers
had no more manpower reserves
James Corum
No. General Pershing's intransigence 18 (3)
concerning the integration of U.S. troops
into existing Allied units cost lives and
time when both were in short supply
James J. Cooke
American Tactics: Was General Pershing's 21 (8)
emphasis on open warfare appropriate for the
Western Front?
Yes. General Pershing recognized that the 22 (3)
war could not be decided from the trenches.
The problem of the American Expeditionary
Force (AEF) was less a failure of strategy
than defective training systems
James J. Cooke
No. The American Expeditionary Force (AEF) 25 (4)
went to Europe with a tactical doctrine
unsuitable to the nature of the war and, as
a result, U.S. forces paid a heavy price
Mark E. Grotelueschen
Anglo-German Naval Race: Was the naval arms 29 (8)
race the central factor in the growth of
Anglo-German antagonism prior to World War I?
Yes. As the premier naval power at the turn 30 (3)
of the twentieth century, Great Britain
felt threatened by the growing naval
capabilities and heavy-handed diplomacy of
Germany
Paul Du Quenoy
No. The German naval threat was almost 33 (4)
welcome, as the one challenge Britain was
confident it could defeat. German hostility
was instead the price Britain paid for
rapprochement with her imperial rivals,
France and Russia
John Abbatiello
Arab Uprising: Did the Arab uprising of 1916 37 (6)
contribute significantly to the military and
political developments in the Middle East?
Yes. The Arab revolt gave the Allies 38 (1)
political leverage in the region and
established Arab nationalism as a postwar
force
John Wheatley
No. The Arab revolt represented a minor 39 (4)
military event that was peripheral to the
more significant fighting taking place west
of the Jordan River
Edward J. Erickson
Austria-Hungary: Did Austria-Hungary's 43 (8)
abandonment of great-power status to
concentrate on the Balkans play a major role
in generating the Great War?
Yes. Austria-Hungary in 1914 had become, de 44 (3)
facto, another Balkan power, and it was
correspondingly indifferent to the
consequences of its actions in Europe
Graydon A. Tunstall
No. The policy of Austria-Hungary after the 47 (4)
assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand
reflected a determination to maintain the
Dual Monarchy's status as a great power,
able and willing to act independently in
defense of its own vital interests
John Wheatley
BEF Technology: Did the integration of tanks 51 (8)
in the British Expeditionary Force (BEF)
contribute to the Allied victory?
Yes. Armor was the central element of 52 (3)
British Expeditionary Force (BEF) tactics
in the final offensives of 1918
Robert M. Citino
No. In the final Allied offensives of 1918 55 (4)
mechanical warfare and tanks were less
significant to victory than traditional
technologies, especially artillery
William J. Astore
Combat Experience: Did blood lust prolong the 59 (7)
war?
Yes. The blood lust exhibited by frontline 60 (1)
soldiers throughout the conflict stopped
only with the collapse of the German war
effort
William R. Forstchen
No. The ordinary frontline soldier was no 61 (5)
more inclined to act aggressively against
the enemy than to adopt a ``live and let
live'' approach toward him
Mary Habeck
Culture of the Offensive: Were the war plans 66 (11)
of 1914 manifestations of a ``culture of the
offensive'' at any cost?
Yes. Between 1871 and 1914 European armies 67 (2)
moved toward an intellectualized concept of
the offensive as a sovereign recipe for
victory, without regard for the objective
analyses of developments in technology and
administration that predicted a prolonged
war
William R. Forstchen
No. Many military planners before 1914 69 (3)
envisioned a limited offensive war of short
duration in which the European balance of
power would be maintained
Daniel Lee Butcher
No. The general commitment to offensive 72 (5)
warfare reflected a careful calculation of
prewar armies' perceived strengths,
weaknesses, and potential as well as the
similarities characterizing those armies
Robert T. Foley
David Lloyd George: Was David Lloyd George an 77 (7)
effective wartime prime minister?
Yes. Lloyd George provided strong 78 (3)
leadership when Britain was under intense
pressure on many fronts. His personal charm
and political skills were major assets, and
it is unlikely any of his contemporaries
could have done better
Philip Giltmer
No. Lloyd George's pursuit of victory at 81 (3)
all costs committed Britain to policies
that could not be sustained, and the
nation's survival depended upon strokes of
good fortune
Robert McJimsey
East Africa: Was the 1914-1918 campaign of 84 (7)
German general Paul von Lettow-Vorbeck in
East Africa a success?
Yes. As both a military operation and an 85 (2)
example of creating a multiethnic army,
Lettow-Vorbeck's campaign was brilliant
Michelle Moyd
No. The demographic and ecological havoc 87 (4)
wrought by Lettow-Vorbeck's operations had
little impact on the German war effort
William J. Astore
Eastern Europe: Did German occupation 91 (11)
policies in Eastern Europe prefigure those of
the Third Reich?
Yes. The Nazis, who added genocidal racism 92 (5)
to the mix, perpetuated German views of the
East and its peoples as fields of conquest
and development
Lawrence A. Helm
No. The German occupation of Eastern Europe 97 (5)
was concerned initially with providing
administration and security and
subsequently with reorganizing the
conquered territory along traditional
imperialist lines
Paul Du Quenoy
Easterners and Westerners: Was the conflict 102 (7)
between Prime Minister David Lloyd George and
Chief of Staff Sir William Robertson the
result of a basic disagreement on war
strategy?
Yes. David Lloyd George emphasized military 103 (2)
operations in the East while Sir William
Robertson advocated continuing the
offensive in the West
Michael S. Neiberg
No. David Lloyd George and Sir William 105 (4)
Robertson had flexibility in their
respective positions, but they were unable
to find a way of working together
systematically
William J. Astore
Firepower and Mobility: Was the crucial 109 (8)
military problem of World War I an imbalance
between firepower and mobility on the
battlefield?
Yes. By successfully addressing the 110 (2)
tactical problem of the ``last 300 yards of
no man's land,'' the Allies won the Great
War
William J. Astore
No. The crucial military problem of World 112 (5)
War I was that Allied leaders formulated
offensive strategies that never
accommodated the realities of trench warfare
David J. Ulbrich
Gallipoli: Was the Allied effort on the 117 (7)
Gallipoli Peninsula doomed from the start?
Yes. Allied planners seriously 118 (3)
underestimated Turkish fighting
capabilities and defensive preparations
Edward J. Erickson
No. Poor decisions made on the strategic, 121 (3)
operational, and tactical levels determined
the failure of the Gallipoli campaign
Dennis Showalter
Gender Roles: Were women excluded from the 124 (8)
Great War?
Yes. World War I essentially was a 125 (3)
masculine activity
David J. Ulbrich
No. The Great War was an experience that 128 (4)
both transcended and denied sex-role
stereotyping
William J. Astore
German Commerce Raiders: Were German 132 (7)
surface-commerce raiders effective?
Yes. Surface raiders exercised continuous 133 (2)
pressure on commercial shipping in open
waters
Sanders Marble
No. Surface-commerce raiding was 135 (4)
obsolescent as early as 1914, having no
more than a nuisance value against the
British maritime empire
David H. Olivier
German Economic Mobilization: Was the 139 (7)
1916-1917 Hindenburg-Ludendorff program for
German economic mobilization a failure?
Yes. The mobilization of national resources 140 (3)
intended by the program took little account
of German economic realities
Dennis Showalter
No. The program eventually did succeed in 143 (3)
integrating the army, industry, and labor
behind the war effort to a significant
degree
David N. Spires
Internal French Politics: Did internal French 146 (8)
politics prior to World War I significantly
weaken relations between the civil government
and the military?
Yes. The mutual suspicion and hostility of 147 (4)
the years before 1914 endured throughout
the conflict and negatively shaped French
conduct in the war
Michael S. Neiberg
No. Prewar political animosity dissipated 151 (3)
with the need to confront a common
challenge and enemy
Eugenia C. Kiesling
Irish Independence: How did the Great War 154 (9)
affect the Irish independence movement?
The Great War renewed the historical 155 (1)
divisions of British intransigence and
Irish nationalist factionalism, resulting
in the drift of the independence movement
into militancy
Robert McJimsey
The Great War afforded the Irish 156 (4)
independence movement with an opportunity
to strike against Britain while its
attention was concentrated on the Continent
William Kautt
By declaring the defense of the rights of 160 (3)
small nations among its war aims, Britain
lost its moral authority in Ireland and
inadvertently strengthened the independence
movement there
James S. Corum
Jewish Community: What impact did the war 163 (7)
have on the European Jewish community?
Physical devastation and a surge in 164 (2)
anti-Semitism combined to make the lot of
European Jews far worse in 1919 than in 1914
Michael S. Neiberg
By the end of the war Europe was more 166 (4)
tolerant of Jews as evidenced by their
greater role in political, cultural, and
intellectual life
Paul Du Quenoy
Kerensky: Did the Kerensky government make a 170 (9)
mistake when it tried to keep Russia in the
war?
Yes. The decision of the new government 171 (3)
antagonized the proponents of the slogan
``Peace, Land, Bread!''
Josh Sanborn
No. The new government needed all the help 174 (5)
it could get, and the promise of generous
French and British support made staying in
the war a reasonable calculated risk
Paul Du Quenoy
Lorraine: Was the 1914 German offensive in 179 (7)
Lorraine an appropriate response to altered
circumstances on the Western Front?
Yes. Having defeated the initial French 180 (2)
offensive in Lorraine, the Germans were
justified in committing reserves t
reinforce theirposition
Dennis Showalter
No. Diverting forces to a secondary theater 182 (4)
in the south seriously hampered German
efforts in Belgium
Paul Du Quenoy
Lost Generation: Did the Great War create a 186 (7)
``lost generation''?
Yes. The war did in fact exact a 187 (1)
disproportionate physical and psychic toll
on Europe's ``best and brightest'' young men
Mary Habeck
No. The ``lost generation'' was an 188 (5)
invention of the interwar years, a
convenient excuse for those who failed to
mee the challenges that arose after 1918
Adrian Gregory
New Weapons: Did World War I accelerate the 193 (9)
technological development of weaponry?
Yes. The synergies of technical development 194 (3)
of weaponry during World War I represented
a marked change in the conduct of war as
well as the attitudes about it
William J. Astore
No. The technological innovations 197 (5)
introduced in 1914-1918 were part of a
continuum of increasingly improved
firepower capabilities
William Kautt
Organized Religion: Did organized religion 202 (9)
support the war efforts of the various
nations involved in the Great War?
Yes. Many Christian denominations, 203 (4)
motivated by patriotism, viewed the
struggle as a spiritual test of their
respective nations' moral virtue
William J. Astore
No. The churches provided one of the first 207 (4)
influential sources of challenge to
specific aspects of the war's conduct
William Kautt
Ottoman Empire: Did the collapse of the 211 (7)
Ottoman Empire during the war establish the
conditions for the rise of the Turkish state
afterward?
Yes. Conflict with various European nations 212 (2)
and internal Arab rebellion reduced the
Ottoman Empire to a core Turkish state
Michael S. Neiberg
No. The achievements of the Ottoman Empire 214 (4)
during the war were remarkable, and its
weaknesses and handicaps in no way
prefigured a Turkish nationalist successor
state
Edward J. Erickson
Passchendaele: Should the Passchendaele 218 (7)
offensive of 1917 have been called off once
it became clear that a breakthrough was
impossible?
Yes. Because of the early high casualties 219 (4)
and failed initial assaults, the British
should have stopped the offensive before
the heavy rains began
William J. Astore
No. A steadily increasing British 223 (2)
battlefield superiority legitimated Sir
Douglas Haig's belief that the attack was
worth pursuing, even under the appalling
weather conditions
Dennis Showalter
Permanent Alliances: Did the system of 225 (7)
permanent alliances that arose in Europe
after 1871 cause World War I?
Yes. The alliances encouraged belligerence 226 (2)
and risk taking by making all the great
powers believe they would be supported by
their allies in almost any situation
Richard L. Dinardo
No. If any factor shaped diplomacy, it was 228 (4)
the perceived weakness of pre-1914 alliance
treaties, all of which featured escape
clauses and reservations as opposed to
affirming mutual support
Paul Du Quenoy
Plan XVII: Was Plan XVII the blueprint for a 232 (7)
French offensive?
Yes. Plan XVII was an aggressive military 233 (2)
strategy that dictated the need to seize
the initiative from the Germans and not
allow them time to coordinate a proper
defense
Robert B. Bruce
No. Plan XVII made provisions only for the 235 (4)
mobilization and concentration of French
troops and not their offensive use on the
battlefield
Eugenia C. Kiesling
Poison Gas: Was the poison gas used in World 239 (6)
War I essentially a nuisance weapon?
Yes. Gas was used primarily for harassment, 240 (1)
increasing the misery of war and lowering
morale
David N. Spires
No. When used properly, in conjunction with 241 (4)
small arms fire and artillery barrages, gas
was a lethal weapon
James Corum
Schlieffen Plan: Was the Schlieffen Plan of 245 (9)
the German General Staff a sound war strategy?
Yes. The various directives that made up 246 (2)
the German war plan indicate a high level
of flexibility and a willingness to respond
to events
Robert T. Foley
No. The Schlieffen Plan was predicated on 248 (3)
an inexorable progression to an
all-or-nothing victory
Antulio Echevarria
No. The Schlieffen Plan seriously 251 (3)
underestimated the capabilities of enemy
forces and did not take into account their
tenacity and rapid deployment
John Wheatley
Socialists: Did European Socialists give 254 (9)
their ultimate loyalty to national
governments rather than the universal
proletariat during the war?
Yes. Socialist parties sustained national 255 (5)
war efforts with recruits, votes, and
propaganda
Paul Du Quenoy
No. Socialists took advantage of the 260 (3)
general war weariness to advance the cause
of workers
Dennis Showalter
Soldiers' Motivations: What motivated 263 (8)
soldiers in all armies to fight?
The essential reason why millions of 264 (3)
soldiers continued to fight was consent,
derived from love of country, hatred of the
enemy, and a crusading spirit
William J. Astore
Comradeship and coercion ultimately kept 267 (4)
soldiers at their posts
David J. Ulbrich
The Somme: Were the British doomed in the 271 (6)
Battle of the Somme (1916) by the decision to
seek a decisive breakthrough?
Yes. Sir Douglas Haig's decision to seek a 272 (1)
decisive breakthrough damaged his army's
ability to sustain itself in the later
stages of the operation
Dennis Showalter
No. The problems experienced by the British 273 (4)
Expeditionary Force (BEF) at the Somme
reflected inexperience in planning for such
an offensive
Albert Palazzo
Treaty of Versailles: Did the Treaty of 277 (10)
Versailles in 1919 provide the framework for
a durable peace?
Yes. The Versailles settlement was 278 (3)
purposely designed to establish lasting
international stability. It was no harsher
than comparable treaties and was entirely
appropriate for the political environment
of 1919
Michael S. Neiberg
No. The Treaty of Versailles was disastrous 281 (6)
because it embittered Germany and fostered
political radicalism in that country
Paul Du Quenoy
Unrestricted Submarine Warfare: Was the 287 (8)
German policy of unrestricted submarine
warfare a commitment to total war?
Yes. By targeting all shipping and sinking 288 (2)
vessels without warning, Germany practiced
a form of total war on its enemies
John Abbatiello
No. Although the desire to remove Great 290 (5)
Britain from the conflict was great,
Germany was incapable of accomplishing such
a task
Mark Karau
War and America: Did the Great War have a 295 (8)
positive impact on the United States?
Yes. The war provided focus for the United 296 (3)
States and introduced the nation to the
nature of its responsibilities as a great
power
Kristi L. Nichols
No. World War I highlighted and exacerbated 299 (4)
internal ethnic, social, and economic
tensions, while militarizing the country to
a far greater degree than even the Civil War
Michael S. Neiberg
References 303 (8)
Contributors' Notes 311 (2)
Index 313