基本説明
The role of 'incentives' is considered in this economic approach to family law.
Full Description
What sort of contract is marriage? What does it offer the parties? What are the difficulties of enforcement, and the result of failed effective enforcement? This book takes an economic approach to marriage and divorce, considering the key role of 'incentives' in family law: it highlights the possible adverse consequences emanating from faulty legal design, while demonstrating that good family law should provide incentives for consistent and honest behavior. Economists, specialists in the economic analysis of law, and academic lawyers discuss recent advances in specialist work on marriage, cohabitation, and divorce. Chapters are grouped around four topics: the contractual perspectives on marriage commitment; the regulatory framework surrounding divorce; bargaining and commitment issues relating to marriage and near-marriage arrangements; and finally empirical work, which focuses on the impact of more liberal divorce laws. This important new study will be of considerable interest to lawyers, policy-makers and economists concerned with family law.
Contents
1. Introduction Antony W. Dnes and Robert Rowthorn; 2. Marriage: the long-term contract Lloyd R. Cohen; 3. Marital commitment and the legal regulation of divorce Elizabeth S. Scott; 4. Mutual consent divorce Allen M. Parkman; 5. An economic approach to adultery law Eric Rasmusen; 6. Louisiana's covenant marriage law: recapturing the meaning of marriage for the sake of the children Katherine Shaw Spaht; 7. Cohabitation and marriage Antony W. Dnes; 8. Marriage as a signal Robert Rowthorn; 9. For better or for worse? Is bargaining in marriage and divorce efficient? Martin Zelder; 10. Weak men and disorderly women: divorce and the division of labour Stephen L. Nock and Margaret F. Brinig; 11. Impact of legal reforms on marriage and divorce Douglas W. Allen; 12. European divorce laws, divorce rates and their consequences Ian Smith.
