Description
Kai Draper begins his book with the assumption that individual rights exist and stand as moral obstacles to the pursuit of national no less than personal interests. That assumption might seem to demand a pacifist rejection of war, for any sustained war effort requires military operations that predictably kill many noncombatants as "collateral damage," and presumably at least most noncombatants have a right not to be killed. Yet Draper ends with the conclusion that sometimes recourse to war is justified.In making his argument, he relies on the insights of John Locke to develop and defend a framework of rights to serve as the foundation for a new just war theory. Notably missing from that framework is any doctrine of double effect. Most just war theorists rely on that doctrine to justify injuring and killing innocent bystanders, but Draper argues that various prominent formulations of the doctrine are either untenable or irrelevant to the ethics of war. Ultimately he offers a single principle for assessing whether recourse to war would be justified. He also explores in some detail the issue of how to distinguish discriminate from indiscriminate violence in war, arguing that some but not all noncombatants are liable to attack.
Table of Contents
AcknowledgmentsChapter 1: Introduction1.1: Overview1.2: Individualism vs. collectivism1.3: Methodology1.4: The existence of moral rights1.5: TerminologyChapter 2: A Lockean Framework of Rights2.1: The right to one's own person2.2: Property rights and rights of first arrival2.3: Negative need rights2.4: Autonomy, well-being, and rightsChapter 3: Rights and Harm3.1: The doctrine of doing and allowing3.2: Quinn's interpretation of the doctrine3.3: Foot's interpretation of the doctrine3.4: The causal interpretation of the doctrine3.5: The acting-on interpretation of the doctrine3.6: A rights-based alternative3.7: Three objections3.8: Rights and intentionsChapter 4: Liability to Defense4.1: The rights enforcement account4.2: Defense against the innocent4.3: Defense of the guilty4.4: The defense liability principle4.5: Forfeiture4.6: Montague and McMahanChapter 5: Necessity and Proportionality in Defense5.1: A defense of internalism5.2: Necessary harm5.3: Proportionate harm5.4: Do the numbers count?Chapter 6: Liberating Just War Theory from Double Effect6.1: The structure of my argument6.2: PDE, MP and rights6.3: Quinn's defense of double effect6.4: Recent attempts to improve upon Quinn6.5: The restricted claims principle6.6: Alleged support for a strongly discriminating principle6.7: The irrelevance of weakly discriminating principlesChapter 7: The Rights of Innocent Bystanders7.1: Unauthorized violence7.2: Excusable violence7.3: Liability through assumed risk7.4: Ex ante compensation7.5: Justifiable infringements upon rightsChapter 8: How to Justify Waging War8.1: The justifiable war principle8.2: Is the justifiable war principle too demanding?8.3: The flaws of traditional jus ad bellumChapter 9: The Scope of Liability in War9.1: Combatants and military personnel9.2: Those who assist unjust aggressors9.3: Munitions workers9.4: Farmers and taxpayersChapter 10: Citizenship and Liability10.1: Agency and liability10.2: Nonintervention and liabilityChapter 11: ConclusionsAppendix: Need Rights and CompensationIndex
