Description
Social scientists are often vexed because their work does not satisfy the criteria of "scientific" methodology developed by philosophers of science and logicians who use the natural sciences as their model. In this study, Paul Diesing defines science not by reference to these arbitrary norms delineated by those outside the field but in terms of norms implicit in what social scientists actually do in their everyday work.
Table of Contents
1: Introduction; I: Formal Methods and Theories; 2: General Characteristics of Formal Theories; 3: The Development of a Formal Theory; 4: Experimental Work with Mathematical Models; 5: The Analysis and Verification of Computer Models; 6: Types of Formal Theories; 7: Uses of Models; 8: Formalization; 9: The Implicit Ontology of Formalists; II: Participant–Observer and Clinical Methods; 10: The Holist Standpoint; 11: Main Steps of a Case Study; 12: Holistic Uses of Statistics; 13: Comparative Methods and the Development of Theory; 14: Typologies : Real and Ideal Types; 15: Some Characteristics of Holist Theories; 16: The Use and Verification of General Theory; 17: Structural–Functional Theories; 18: The Practical Use of Case Studies; 19: Weaknesses and Problems of Case Study Methods; 20: The Implicit Ontology of Case Study Methods; III: Methods in the Philosophy of Science; 21: The Participant–Observer Method; 22: The Method of Rational Reconstruction; 23: The Typological Method; 24: The Method of Conceptual Analysis; 25: Science, Philosophy, and Astrology
