Deontology, Responsibility, and Equality

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Deontology, Responsibility, and Equality

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  • 製本 Paperback:紙装版/ペーパーバック版/ページ数 503 p.
  • 言語 ENG,ENG
  • 商品コード 9788763502252
  • DDC分類 170

Full Description


Can deontological moral constraints be justified? When, if ever, are we morally responsible for what we do? How is the ideal of equality best configured? Deontology, Responsibility and Equality deals with selected aspects of these three broad questions that loom large in moral and political philosophy.NER(01): GB IE

Table of Contents

Preface                                            9  (3)
Sources 12 (1)
Introduction 13 (88)
Preliminaries 13 (2)
Deontology 15 (3)
Non-deontology 18 (1)
The charge of irrationality 19 (5)
The non-equivalence principle 24 (4)
Complexity 28 (2)
The act concept 30 (5)
The course of nature 35 (2)
Facts about behaviour 37 (3)
Harms 40 (3)
The concept of responsibility 43 (3)
Determinism, compatibilism, and 46 (1)
incompatibilism
Ability to do otherwise and the transfer 47 (7)
argument
Libertarianism 54 (6)
Moral responsibility without free will 60 (2)
Compatibilist responses 62 (9)
Defending the principle of alternative 71 (2)
possibilities
The ideal of equality 73 (5)
Responsibility for being worse off 78 (4)
Telic versus deontic egalitarianism 82 (6)
In itself bad 88 (5)
Is inequality bad or is equality good? 93 (2)
Equally well off in terms of what? 95 (4)
Non-distributive egalitarian concerns 99 (2)
Deontology 101(113)
Moral status and the impermissibility of 101(20)
minimizing violations
Introduction 101(2)
The inviolability account 103(4)
Challenges 107(2)
Two conceptions of inviolability 109(2)
Minimizing violations and responsibility 111(3)
Inviolability and independence compared 114(4)
Challenges 118(3)
In what ways are constraints paradoxical? 121(25)
Introduction 121(2)
Nozick on side constraints 123(2)
Scheffler: the puzzle of 125(3)
non-maximization
Kamm: expressing respect and concern 128(4)
for rights
Nagel: the impersonal value of 132(14)
constraints
Are killing and letting die morally 146(26)
equivalent?
The issue 146(4)
Non-life-shortening killings and cases 150(3)
of lettings die
Why we should reject the actual 153(6)
sequence account of the prima facie
wrongness of killing
The intuition about respect: Malm 159(13)
Life-prolonging killings and their 172(13)
relevance to ethics
The conceivability of life-prolonging 172(4)
killings
Two challenges 176(2)
Failing to notice the conceivability of 178(3)
life-prolonging killings - three
examples
Why the conceivability of 181(4)
life-prolonging killings matters for
moral theory
Two puzzles for deontologists: 185(29)
life-prolonging killings and the moral
symmetry between killing and causing a
person to be unconscious
Preliminaries 185(2)
The possibility of life-prolonging 187(5)
killings
Some standard accounts of the wrongness 192(8)
of killings
The constraints against the killing of 200(4)
innocents
An agent-relative constraint against 204(10)
(life-shortening) killing?
Moral Responsibility 214(104)
Er determinisme og moralsk ansvar 214(25)
forenelige?
Princippet om alternative 214(2)
handlingsmuligheder
Frankfurts kritik af princippet om 216(4)
alternative handlingsmuligheder
En deterministisk version af 220(6)
eksempel(A)?
Det moralske ansvars objekter 226(13)
Does moral responsibility presuppose 239(14)
alternative possibilities?
Kompatibilisme og moralsk ansvar for 253(23)
undladelser af handlinger
Princippet om alternative 253(2)
handlingsmuligheder
Frankfurt om PAH 255(3)
Undladelser af handlinger 258(13)
Er Frankfurtske eksempler 271(3)
kohærente?
Moralsk held og PAH 274(2)
Frankfurt, responsibility, and reflexivity 276(12)
Preliminaries 276(1)
Frankfurt on freedom and moral 277(3)
responsibility
Reflective awareness and responsibility 280(8)
Identification and responsibility 288(30)
Preliminaries 288(3)
Frankfurt on acting freely and moral 291(2)
responsibility
Higher-order volitions and values 293(5)
Decisions and contentment 298(2)
Planning and the desire to act on 300(7)
reasons
The authoritative and the authentic self 307(5)
The whim problem 312(2)
Identification and sources of 314(3)
identification
Conclusion 317(1)
Equality 318(120)
Arneson on equality of opportunity for 318(12)
welfare
Equality and responsibility 330(25)
Introduction 330(3)
Actual-and alternative-sequence 333(3)
egalitarianism
Arneson and Cohen on equality 336(3)
Frankfurt on responsibility 339(4)
Alternative-sequence egalitarianism 343(6)
Actual-choice egalitarianism 349(3)
Responsibility-robust egalitarianism 352(3)
Egalitarianism, option luck, and 355(38)
responsibility
Introduction 355(3)
Dworkin on option luck and brute luck 358(8)
Unacceptable risks and the sufficiency 366(6)
view
Which probabilities? Which outcomes? 372(10)
Differential option luck and 382(5)
responsibility
On the badness of inequality that 387(6)
reflect differential exercises of
responsibility
Measuring the disvalue of inequality over 393(14)
time
Are some inequalities more unequal than 407(31)
others? Nature, nurture, and equality
Introduction 407(4)
Social versus natural inequalities 411(8)
Different distinctions 419(1)
Nationalist and other restricted-scope 420(5)
egalitarians
The concern for inequality resulting 425(5)
from unfair treatment
Making versus allowing inequalities 430(3)
Purely procedural egalitarianism 433(4)
Conclusion 437(1)
Appendices 438(45)
Appendix 1: Methodology 438(22)
Methodological elements 438(3)
A coherentist account of the 441(6)
justification of moral beliefs
Foundationalism 447(7)
Moral justification scepticism 454(6)
Appendix 2: On defending a significant 460(23)
version of the constancy assumption
Introduction 460(4)
The insignificance challenge 464(10)
The challenge from extreme particularism 474(4)
Contrast arguments 478(5)
Summary 483(7)
Bibliography 490