Trust (Critical Studies in Economic Institutions, 3)

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Trust (Critical Studies in Economic Institutions, 3)

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  • 製本 Hardcover:ハードカバー版/ページ数 800 p.
  • 言語 ENG
  • 商品コード 9781840647372
  • DDC分類 330.01

Full Description


Trust is an authoritative collection of previously published articles and is unique in the growing literature on trustworthiness. The broad ranging articles are organized into three parts, expressing three definite answers to the question posed in the introduction: Why does trustworthiness pay? Part I, `Trust as Strategy', stipulates that trust is an investment in reputation. Part II, `Trust as Taste', argues that agents have a preference for trustworthiness, which may explain the anomaly of trustworthiness in single-shot games. Part III, `Trust as Trait', maintains that trust is a trait that evolutionary selection may favor. In his extensive introductory essay, Elias Khalil elaborates and contrasts the strengths and weaknesses of each answer.Including over 35 articles from diverse disciplines such as economics, sociology, political science, anthropology, philosophy, psychology, evolutionary biology, and organizational studies, Trust will be a valuable reference for many years to come.

Table of Contents

Acknowledgements                                   ix
Introduction Why Does Trustworthiness Pay?
Three Answers
Elias L. Khalil xiii
PART I TRUST AS STRATEGY
1. Gordon Tullock (1985), 'Adam Smith and the 3 (9)
Prisoners' Dilemma', Quarterly Journal of
Economics,100 (402), Supplement, 1073-81
2. Robert Axelrod and Douglas Dion (1988), 12 (6)
'The Further Evolution of Cooperation',
Science, 242 (4884), 9 December, 1385-90
3. Jack Hirshleifer (1999), 'There are Many 18 (21)
Evolutionary Pathways to Cooperation',
Journal of Bioeconomics,1(1), 73-93
4. Oliver E. Williamson (1983), 'Credible 39 (22)
Commitments: Using Hostages to Support
Exchange', American Economic Review, 73 (4),
September, 519-40
5. David M. Kreps, Paul Milgrom, John Roberts 61 (8)
and Robert Wilson (1982), 'Rational
Cooperation in the Finitely Repeated
Prisoners' Dilemma', Journal of Economic
Theory, 21(2), August, 245-52
6. John Gale, Kenneth G. Binmore and Larry 69 (35)
Samuelson (1995), 'Learning to Be Imperfect:
The Ultimatum Game', Games and Economic
Behavior, 8, 56-90
7. Edward H. Lorenz (1988), 'Neither Friends 104 (17)
nor Strangers: Informal Networks of
Subcontracting in French Industry', in Diego
Gambetta (ed.), Trust: Making and Breaking
Cooperative Relations, Chapter 12, Oxford:
Basil Blackwell, 194-210
8. Keith Hart (1988), 'Kinship, Contract, and 121 (18)
Trust: The Economic Organization of Migrants
in an African City Slum', in Diego Gambetta
(ed.), Trust: Making and Breaking Cooperative
Relations, Chapter 11, Oxford: Basil
Blackwell, 176-93
9. Peter Kollock (1994), 'The Emergence of 139 (33)
Exchange Structures: An Experimental Study of
Uncertainty, Commitment, and Trust', American
Journal of Sociology,100 (2), September,
313-45
10. Avner Greif, Paul Milgrom and Barry R. 172 (32)
Weingast (1994), 'Coordination, Commitment,
and Enforcement: The Case of the Merchant
Guild', Journal of Political Economy, 102
(4), August, 745-76
11. Oliver E. Williamson (1993), 204 (34)
'Calculativeness, Trust, and Economic
Organization', Journal of Law and Economics,
XXXVI (1, Part 2), April, 453-86
12. Bart Nooteboom (1996), 'Trust, 238 (26)
Opportunism and Governance: A Process and
Control Model', Organization Studies, 17 (6),
985-1010
13. Bernd Lahno (2001), 'On the Emotional 264 (21)
Character of Trust', Ethical Theory and Moral
Practice, 4 (2), June, 171-89
PART II TRUSTAS TASTE
14. Ernst Pehr and Simon G臘hter (2000), 285 (23)
'Fairness and Retaliation: The Economics of
Reciprocity', Journal of Econoinic
Perspectives, 14 (3), Summer, 159-81
15. Werner G h and Reinhard Tietz (1990), 308 (33)
'Ultimatum Bargaining Behavior: A Survey and
Comparison of Experimental Results', Journal
of Economic Psychology, 11 (4), December,
417-49
16. Alvin E. Roth, Vesna Prasnikar, Masahiro 341 (28)
Okuno-Fujiwara and Samuel Zamir (1991),
'Bargaining and Market Behavior in Jerusalem,
Ljubljana, Pittsburgh, and Tokyo: An
Experimental Study', American Economic
Review, 81(5), December, 1068-95
17. Joseph Henrich, Robert Boyd, Samuel 369 (6)
Bowles, Colin Camerer, Ernst Fehr, Herbert
Grotis and Richard McElreath (2001), 'In
Search of Homo Economicus: Behavioral
Experiments in 15 Small-Scale Societies',
American Economic Review, Papers and
Proceedings, 91 (2), May, 73-8
18. James Andreoni (1988), 'Why Free Ride? 375 (14)
Strategies and Learning in Public Goods
Experiments', Journal of Public Economics, 37
(3), December, 291-304
19. Richard H. Thaler with Robyn M. Dawes 389 (17)
(1992), 'Cooperation', in The Winner  Curse.
Paradoxes and Anomalies of Economic Life,
Chapter 2, Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press, 6-20, references
20. Joyce Berg, John Dickhaut and Kevin 406 (21)
McCabe (1995), 'Trust, Reciprocity, and
Social History', Games and Economic Behavior,
10,122-42
21. Andreas Ortmann, John Fitzgerald and Carl 427 (20)
Boeing (2000), 'Trust, Reciprocity, and
Social History: A Re-examination',
Experimental Economics, 3 (1), June, 81-100
22. Daniel Kahneman, Jack L. Knetsch and 447 (14)
Richard Thaler (1986), 'Fairness as a
Constraint on Profit Seeking: Entitlements in
the Market', American Economic Review, 76
(4), September, 728-41
23. George A. Akerlof (1982), 'Labor 461 (27)
Contracts as a Partial Gift Exchange',
Quarterly Journal of Economics, XCVII (4),
November, 543-69
24. Matthew Rabin (1993), 'Incorporating 488 (22)
Fairness into Game Theory and Economics',
American Economic Review, 83 (5), December,
1281-302
25. David K. Levine (1998), 'Modeling 510 (30)
Altruism and Spitefulness in Experiments',
Review of Economic Dynamics, 1 (3), July,
593-622
26. Amitai Etzioni (1986), 'The Case foi- a 540 (25)
Multiple-Utility Conception', Economics amid
Philosophy, 2 (2), October, 159-83
27. Amartya K. Sen (1977), 'Rational Fools: A 565 (28)
Critique of the Behavioral Foundations of
Economic Theory', Philosophy and Public
Affairs, 6 (4), 317-44
28. Elias L. Khalil (1999), 'Sentimental 593 (16)
Fools: A Critique of Amartya Sera's Notion of
Commitment', Journal of Economic Behavior and
Organization, 40 (4), December, 373-86
PART III TRUST AS TRAIT
29. Ulrich Witt (1986), 'Evolution and 609 (22)
Stability of Cooperation without Enforceable
Contracts', Kyklos, 39 (2), 245-66
30. Werner G h, Hartmut Kliemt and Bezalel 631 (28)
Peleg (2000), 'Co-evolution of Preferences
and Information in Simple Games of Trust',
German Economic Review, l (1), February,
83-110
31. Werner G h and Menahem E. Yaari (1992), 659 (12)
'Explaining Reciprocal Behavior in Simple
Strategic Games: An Evolutionary Approach',
in Ulrich Witt (ed.), Explaining Process and
Change: Approaches to Evolutionary Economics,
Chapter 2, Ann Arbor, MI: University of
Michigan Press, 23-34
32. Herbert Gintis (2000), 'Strong 671 (11)
Reciprocity and Human Sociality', Journal of
Theoretical Biology, 206,169-79
33. Robert H. Frank (1987), 'If Homo 682 (12)
Economicus Could Choose His Own Utility
Function, Would He Want One with a
Conscience?', American Economic Review, 77
(4), September, 593-604
34. Jack Hirshleifer (1987), 'On the Emotions 694 (20)
as Guarantors of Threats and Promises', in
John Depr (ed.), The Latest on the Best:
Essays on Evolution and Optimality, Chapter
14, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 307-26
35. J n P.W. Scharlemann, Catherine C. 714 (24)
Eckel, Alex Kacelnik and Rick K. Wilson
(2001), 'The Value of a Smile: Game Theory
with a Human Face', Journal of Economic
Psychology, 22, 617-40
36. Axel Ockenfels and Reinhard Selten 738 (27)
(2000), 'An Experiment on the Hypothesis of
Involuntary Truth-Signalling in Bargaining',
Games and Economic Behavior, 33 (1), October,
90-116
Name Index 765