Reference and Essence (2ND)

Reference and Essence (2ND)

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  • 言語 ENG,ENG
  • 商品コード 9781591022152
  • DDC分類 110

Table of Contents

Preface to the First Edition                       xiii
Preface to the Expanded Edition xvii
Introduction 3 (6)
I THE THEORY OF DIRECT REFERENCE
ONE. The Theory of Singular Direct Reference
1. A Formulation of the Theory 9 (14)
1.1. The Orthodox Notion of Sense
1.2. Descriptional Singular Terms
1.3. Relationally Descriptional
Singular Terms
1.4. Orthodox Theories and the Theory
of Direct Reference
2. The Arguments 23 (9)
2.1. The Modal Arguments
2.2. The Epistemological Arguments
2.3. The Semantical Arguments
2.4. Contextual Factors in Reference
3. Rigid Designators 32 (10)
3.1. Two Kinds of Rigid Designators:
Persistence and Obstinacy
3.2. Proper Names, Nondescriptionality,
and Obstinacy
3.3. A Criterion for Obstinacy
TWO. The Theory Extended to General Terms
4. A Reformulation of the Theory 42 (17)
4.1. Descriptional General Terms
4.2. Common Nouns as Proper Names
4.3. A Point of Disanalogy
4.4. Designation
4.5. Relationally Descriptional
Designators
4.6. Orthodox Theories and the Theory
of Direct Reference
4.7. The Traditional Theory of
Cognition and Understanding
5. The Arguments Reconsidered 59 (10)
5.1. The General Form of the Arguments
5.2. An Obvious Objection
5.3. A Reply: Putnam's Twin Earth
Argument
6. Rigid Designators Reconsidered 69 (7)
6.1. General Term Designation and Rigid
Designation
6.2. A Criterion for General Term
Designation
THREE. Reference and the Necessary A
Posteriori
7. Some Consequences of the Theory 76 (4)
7.1. Traditional Assimilations
7.2. Necessary A Posteriori Identities
7.3. The General Phenomenon
8. Other Alleged Necessary A Posteriori 80 (7)
Truths
8.1. The Examples
8.2. Trivial Essentialism
8.3. Nontrivial Essentialism Concerning
Natural Kinds
8.4. Nontrivial Essentialism Concerning
Individuals
9. A Crucial Question 87
FOUR. Putnam's Theory of Natural Kind Terms
10. Putnam's Theses 93 (6)
11. Initial Exegetical Remarks 99 (7)
11.1. The is' of Instantiation
11.2. A Gross Misinterpretation
11.3. A Subtle Misinterpretation
11.4. A Difficulty in Interpretation
12. First Formulations 106 (10)
12.1. An Initial Formalization
12.2. Time-Slices and Possible
World-Slices of Continuant Individuals
12.3. An Initial Attempt to Eliminate
Possible World-Slices
13. Cross-World Relations 116 (20)
13.1. Cross-World Construal of Binary
Relations
13.2. Intra-World Attributes,
Extra-World Attributes, and Cross-World
Relations
13.3. A Mechanism for Generating
Cross-World Relations
13.4. Nondenoting Singular Terms
14. Reformulations 136 (12)
14.1. A New Attempt at Formalization
14.2. Thesis (T3)
14.3. Reductionism and Analysis
14.4. Translation into Modal Operator
Discourse
15. Further Exegetical Remarks 148 (13)
15.1. Theses (T5) and (T6)
15.2. Thesis (T4)
15.3. Thesis (T7)
15.4. Thesis (T6) Again
II THE PROGRAM TO DERIVE ESSENTIALISM FROM THE
THEORY OF REFERENCE
FIVE. The K and I Mechanisms
16. Putnam on (T9) 161 (2)
17. Donnellan's Elucidations of (T9) 163 (3)
18. The OK-Mechanism 166 (3)
18.1. A Valid Modal Argument
18.2. The General Case
19. The General K-Mechanism and the 169 (5)
I-Mechanism
19.1. The General K-Mechanism
19.2. The I-Mechanism
20. The Program 174 (2)
SIX. Hidden Essentialism in the K and I
Mechanisms
21. The First Two Premises 176 (1)
22. The Third Premise 176 (7)
22.1. Putnam and Donnellan on the Third
Premise
22.2. Formalization
22.3. The K-Mechanisms
22.4. The I-Mechanism
23. The Failure of the Program 183 (10)
23.1. The Original Argument
23.2. The K and I Mechanisms
SEVEN. Arguments for the Essentiality of
Origin
24. Kripke and the Putnam Program 193 (3)
25. Kripke's "Proof" of the Essentiality of 196 (18)
Origin
25.1. Kripke's Formulation of Argument
25.2. Some Initial Considerations
25.3. The Compossibility Premise
25.4. The Unfinished Argument
25.5. A Principle of Cross-World
Identification
25.6. An Alternative Argument
26. Compossibility Principles and 214 (3)
Cross-World Identification Principles
CONCLUSION 217 (2)
APPENDIX I. Principles of Cross-World
Identification
27. Cross-World Identification Principles 219 (10)
and the Ship of Theseus
27.1. An Argument for Contingent
Identity
27.2. A Fallacy
27.3. A Better Theory
28. The Four Worlds Paradox 229 (24)
28.1. The Argument
28.2. One Solution
28.3. A Better Solution
28.4. Vagueness and the Paradox
APPENDIX II. The Essentialist Principles in the
K and I Mechanisms
29. Donnellan vs. Kripke 253 (1)
30. A Problem in the Epistemology of 253 (2)
Modality
31. The Nonmodal Consequences 255 (5)
32. Connecting Statements 260 (4)
32.1. The Need for Connecting Statements
32.2. The Theoretical Status of the
Connecting Statements
33. Conclusion 264 (1)
APPENDIX III. Fregean Theory and the Four
Worlds Paradox
34. Fregean Theory 265 (3)
35. The Four Worlds Paradox 268 (5)
APPENDIX IV. Modal Paradox: Parts and
Counterparts, Points and Counterpoints
36. Modal Paradox 273 (9)
37. A Modal Fallacy 282 (4)
38. Counterpart Theory 286 (12)
39. Modal Paradox and Sorites 298 (4)
40. Some Shortcomings of Counterpart Theory 302 (10)
41. More Shortcomings of Counterpart Theory 312 (9)
42. The Solution Refined 321 (5)
43. Vagueness and Modal Paradox 326 (5)
44. Twin Worlds 331 (4)
45. Necessity and Apriority 335 (3)
46. The Determinacy of Identity 338 (7)
APPENDIX V. Cross-World Identification and
Stipulation
47. Haecceitism, Reductionism, and the 345 (11)
Problem of Cross-World Identification
48. A Residual Problem of Cross-World 356 (6)
Identification
49. A Third Problem of Cross-World 362 (7)
Identification
APPENDIX VI. Letter to Teresa Robertson
50. If It Ain't Broke, Don't Fix It 369 (2)
51. If It Is, Do 371 (6)
APPENDIX VII. Naming, Necessity, and Beyond
52. Substitution 377 (5)
53. Are General Terms Rigid? 382 (11)
54. The Necessity of Water Being H2O 393 (6)
Select Bibliography 399 (20)
Index of Labeled Expressions of Parts I and II 419 (6)
Index of Subjects of Parts I and II 425