Drawn from the seventh International Symposium in Economic Theory and Econometrics.
The contents of this volume are drawn from the seventh International Symposium in Economic Theory and Econometrics, and represent recent advances in the development of concepts and methods in political economy. Contributors include leading practitioners working on formal, applied, and historical approaches to the subject. The collection will interest scholars in the fields of political science and political sociology no less than economics. Part I outlines relevant concepts in political economy, including implementation, community, ideology, and institutions. Part II covers theory and applications of the spatial model of voting. Part III considers the different characteristics that govern the behaviour of institutions, while Part IV analyses competition between political representatives. Part V is concerned with the way in which government acquires information held by voters or advisors, and Part VI addresses government choice on monetary policy and taxation.
Table of Contents
Political economy: a personal interpretation
and an overview Norman J. Schofield
Part I. Perspectives on Political Economy: 1.
Political ideology, communication, and
community Melvin J. Hinich and Michael C. Munger
2. Implementation and enforcement in
institutional modeling Leonid Hurwicz
3. Toward a theory of institutional change
Douglas C. North
4. The development of contemporary political
theory Peter C. Ordeshook
Part II. Representation and Voting: 5.
Proportional representation, approval voting,
and coalitionally straightforward elections
Roger B. Myerson
6. Party competition in a spatial model of
coalition Norman J. Schofield
7. Some foundations for empirical study in the
Euclidean spatial model of social choice Craig
Part III. Political Institutions: 8.
Communications in institutions: efficiency in a
repeated Prisoner's Dilemma with hidden
information Randall L. Calvert
9. The courts and slavery in the United States:
property rights and credible commitment John N.
10. On the pervasiveness of sophisticated
sincerity Tim Groseclose and Keith Krehbiel
11. Initial versus continuing proposal power in
legislative seniority systems Richard D.
McKelvey and Raymond Riezman
Part IV. Political Competition: 12. Adverse
selection and moral hazard in a repeated
elections model Jeffrey S. Banks and Rangarajan
13. Campaign contributions and party-candidate
competition in services and policies David P.
Baron and Jongryn Mo
14. Polarization, incumbency, and the personal
vote John Londregan and Thomas Romer
15. Credibility and the responsiveness of
Part V. Information Acquisition by Government:
16. Information acquisition and orthogonal
argument David Austen-Smith
17. A welfare analysis of political action
Part VI. Government Behaviouor
18. Monetary policy and credibility under exact
monetary aggregation William A. Barnett
19. A general equilibrium model with endogenous
government behaviour Eric Drissen and Frans Van