Truth without Objectivity (International Library of Philosophy)

Truth without Objectivity (International Library of Philosophy)

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  • 製本 Paperback:紙装版/ペーパーバック版/ページ数 160 p.
  • 言語 ENG,ENG
  • 商品コード 9780415272452
  • DDC分類 121

基本説明

Provides a critique of the mainstream view of 'meaning'.

Full Description


Truth without Objectivity provides a critique of the mainstream view of 'meaning'. Koelbel examines the standard solutions to the conflict implicit in this view, demonstrating their inadequacy and developing instead his own relativist theory of truth.The mainstream view of meaning assumes that understanding a sentence's meaning implies knowledge of the conditions required for it to be true. This view is challenged by taste judgements, which have meaning, but seem to be neither true nor false.

Table of Contents

Preface                                            ix
Introduction xii
Truth-Conditional Semantics 1 (17)
One version of truth-conditional semantics 2 (1)
Compositionality 3 (1)
Force indicators and content indicators 4 (2)
Truth definitions `serving as' meaning 6 (4)
theories
Application to natural languages 10 (1)
Proper communicative function 10 (4)
Communicative acts 14 (2)
Summary and conclusion 16 (2)
Excess Objectivity 18 (17)
Excess objectivity 18 (2)
Three ways of solving the problem of excess 20 (1)
objectivity
Kinds of objectivity 21 (1)
Wright's criterion of cognitive command 22 (2)
The problem of a priori error 24 (1)
Does plain error amount to cognitive 25 (3)
failure?
A new criterion for objectivity 28 (3)
How to solve the problem of a priori error 31 (4)
Revisionism 35 (8)
How to revise a content ascription 35 (1)
The attraction of revisionism 36 (2)
Objection to revisionism: denial 38 (2)
Revising revisionism 40 (3)
Expressivism 43 (26)
Some expressivists 44 (2)
Unendorsed contexts 46 (6)
Searle's adequacy condition 47 (2)
Geach and his Frege-point 49 (3)
Two ways of meeting Geach's challenge 52 (8)
The force-indicator approach 53 (4)
The content-indicator approach 57 (3)
Hale and the grammatical uniformity of 60 (4)
declarative sentences
Resolving Hale's problem 64 (3)
Concluding remarks 67 (2)
Soft Truth 69 (22)
The traditional debate 70 (2)
Two notions of truth 72 (2)
Davidson's programme 74 (11)
The biconditional doctrine 76 (2)
How to derive intensional theorems 78 (3)
Davidson's programme before the truth 81 (1)
doctrine
The emergence of the truth doctrine 82 (3)
Radical interpretation without the notion 85 (3)
of truth
`Meaning as truth condition' 88 (3)
Relative Truth and Linguistic Communication 91 (25)
An absolutist model of linguistic 92 (6)
communication
Background assumptions 92 (1)
Simple cases of communication 93 (1)
Cases of incredulity 94 (4)
Disagreement without error 98 (2)
The relativized truth framework 100(3)
The explanatory status of the theory 103(2)
Methods of belief acquisition 105(2)
Extension of the framework: shades of 107(2)
objectivity
One further application: fiction 109(1)
Alan Gibbard: revisionist, expressivist or 110(6)
relativist?
Defence of Relativism 116(13)
The essence of relativism 116(2)
Classifying relativisms 118(1)
Newton-Smith and the traditional conception 119(3)
of proposition
The dilemma/self refutation 122(2)
Horn (ii) contradicts (GR) 122(1)
Horn (ii) is pragmatically self-refuting 123(1)
Given horn (ii), it is pointless to 123(1)
assert (GR)
The possibility of communication 124(2)
Problems for Protagorean relativism 126(3)
Notes 129(13)
Bibliography 142(5)
Index 147